Essays on the Role of Investment Banks as IPO Underwriters, Mutual Fund Managers, and Merger Advisors by Mooney, Tim
University of Wisconsin Milwaukee
UWM Digital Commons
Theses and Dissertations
May 2013
Essays on the Role of Investment Banks as IPO
Underwriters, Mutual Fund Managers, and Merger
Advisors
Tim Mooney
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.uwm.edu/etd
Part of the Finance and Financial Management Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by UWM Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations
by an authorized administrator of UWM Digital Commons. For more information, please contact open-access@uwm.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mooney, Tim, "Essays on the Role of Investment Banks as IPO Underwriters, Mutual Fund Managers, and Merger Advisors" (2013).
Theses and Dissertations. 140.
https://dc.uwm.edu/etd/140
ESSAYS ON THE ROLE OF INVESTMENT BANKS AS IPO UNDERWRITERS, 
MUTUAL FUND MANAGERS, AND MERGER ADVISORS 
 
by 
 
Tim Mooney 
 
A Dissertation Submitted in 
Partial Fulfillment of the 
Requirements for the Degree of  
 
Doctor of Philosophy  
in Management Science 
 
at 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee 
May 2013 
 
 
 ii 
 
ABSTRACT 
ESSAYS ON THE ROLE OF INVESTMENT BANKS AS IPO UNDERWRITERS, 
MUTUAL FUND MANAGERS, AND MERGER ADVISORS 
 
by 
 
Tim Mooney 
 
 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2013 
Under the Supervision of Professor Lilian K. Ng 
 
 
 
In my first essay, I examine whether the focus on advisors’ merger completion abilities is 
driven by acquirers seeking to complete mergers unconditionally, regardless of value 
implications, or if it is driven by value-maximization considerations. Advisors that 
complete a higher percentage of announced mergers are associated with more certain 
future merger completion. Results reveal that completion expertise has positive value 
implications, but only for acquirers with strong corporate governance. Results also 
suggest that the level of corporate governance of the acquirer determines the value 
consequences of an advisor’s merger completion expertise.  In my second essay, I 
examine the way investment banks allocate IPOs to their affiliated mutual funds 
worldwide.  I analyze IPO allocations to affiliates globally and find significant cross-
country differences in the first-day returns of these IPOs.  I find some support for the 
dumping ground hypothesis outside the U.S.  In addition, IPO allocations to all mutual 
funds—both affiliated and unaffiliated—in countries with strong investor protection tend 
to have higher first-day returns, benefiting fund investors.  Overall, the evidence suggests 
the presence of an economically significant conflict of interest within financial 
conglomerates for which prior literature has not found robust empirical support. 
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Essay 1: Sealing the Deal: Is an Advisor’s Completion Expertise in Mergers & 
Acquisitions Value-Destroying?  
I. Introduction  
In advising their acquirer clients, investment banks face strong incentives to 
complete a merger.  McLaughlin (1990) documents that 80% of the compensation paid to 
the acquirer’s financial advisor is conditional on merger completion rather than on 
whether the merger creates value for the acquirer.  Furthermore, Rau (2000) finds that an 
investment bank’s future market share is positively related to its prior record of 
completing announced mergers, as measured by the share of announced mergers that they 
advised on that ultimately got completed.  Rau’s findings imply that acquirers hire 
advisors based on the advisors’ prior record of completing mergers.  This fixation on 
merger completion is the source of a puzzle; as Rau puts it, “Why does the market fail to 
recognize that providing incentives to complete a deal does not necessarily result in value 
maximization for the acquirer?” (Rau (2000), p.323).  The implicit assumption made by 
some existing studies is that acquirers’ provision of merger completion incentives and 
their pursuit of advisors with stronger merger completion records conflict with value-
creation.  This assumption accords well with the empire-building hypothesis of corporate 
diversification and the evidence of destruction of acquirers’ value in mergers (e.g., 
Masulis, Wang, and Xie, 2007; Bliss and Rosen, 2001).  Similar conjectures have been 
made by the financial press, which often cite completion incentives provided to 
investment banks advising acquirers in mergers as conflicting with the acquirers’ value 
maximization (see, e.g., Financial Times, December 7, 2010, p. 10). 
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We empirically examine whether “completion expertise” causes more value-
destruction in a merger, or whether such expertise fosters value creation for acquirers.  In 
particular, we attempt to examine three key issues: (1) whether an advisor’s expertise in 
completing mergers is persistent and affects the likelihood of completion of future 
mergers, (2) whether that expertise creates or destroys value for the acquirer, and (3) how 
that expertise interacts with the corporate governance of the acquirer. 
The first question that we examine is whether an investment bank’s prior track 
record of completing mergers is associated with the completion of future mergers for 
which it serves as an acquirer’s advisor.  To measure this track record, we use the ratio of 
prior announced mergers that the investment bank served as an acquirer advisor on that 
were ultimately completed (completion ratio).  We use data on U.S. merger attempts 
during 1979–2007 and use multivariate regression analysis to control for multiple 
determinants of merger completion.  We find that the likelihood that an announced 
merger is completed is positively associated with the prior completion ratio of the 
acquirer’s investment bank advisor.  The persistence of an investment bank’s completion 
record suggests that some banks may possess certain completion expertise which is 
reflected in a high fraction of announced mergers that are completed. 
The second question we examine is whether the prior completion track record of 
an acquirer’s advisor contributes to the creation or destruction of the acquirer’s value.  
We assume that the stock market incorporates information about the expected effect of 
the merger on the acquirer’s value at the time of merger announcement.  Thus, we test the 
relation between the prior completion ratio of an acquirer’s advisor and the acquirer’s 
announcement period stock returns, simultaneously controlling for acquirer, merger, and 
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advisor characteristics.  Using the full sample of acquisitions, we find no evidence of a 
significant relation between an advisor’s prior completion ratio and its acquirer client’s 
announcement period returns.   
However, we consider a possibility that the results obtained using the full sample 
mask differences in the effect of advisors’ completion ratios on value across groups of 
acquirers.  For instance, for acquirers that pursue mergers to build empires, an advisor 
with strong completion ability may present an opportunity to complete a merger 
regardless of its value effect.  Conversely, for acquirers motivated by value 
maximization, an advisor with strong completion ability may ensure successful and quick 
completion of a merger, thereby reducing merger costs.  One way to gauge the motivation 
of the acquirer in a merger is by looking at the acquirer’s corporate governance.  Existing 
studies demonstrate that firms with weak corporate governance are more likely to engage 
in wasteful acquisitions and empire building (Masulis, Wang, and Xie, 2007), while those 
with strong governance are more likely to be motivated by value-increasing 
considerations.   
Thus, the third question that we examine is whether the effect of an advisor’s 
completion expertise on acquirer value depends on the corporate governance of the 
acquirer.  In particular, we identify mergers attempted by acquirers that have weak 
corporate governance (measured by a high level of antitakeover provisions) and thus are 
more likely to pursue mergers for empire-building reasons.  Similarly, we identify 
mergers attempted by acquirers with strong corporate governance (low level of 
antitakeover provisions), which are more likely to be motivated by value maximization.  
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Then, we estimate the relation between the advisor’s prior completion ratio and 
acquirer’s announcement period stock returns separately for the two groups of mergers.   
For acquirers with strong corporate governance, we find that the relation between 
completion ratios and acquirer’s announcement returns is positive and statistically 
significant.  For acquirers with weak corporate governance, the relation between prior 
completion ratios and acquirer returns is negative, , albeit marginally significant.  We 
also find that the difference in the effect of completion ratios on acquirer returns is 
statistically significant for mergers attempted by acquirers with strong versus those with 
weak corporate governance.   
Summary statistics reveal the magnitude of the differences between groups.  The 
median and mean acquirer announcement returns are 0.84% and 2.29% for acquirers with 
strong governance advised by high-completion-ratio advisors.  It is the only category of 
mergers with positive average returns.  The lowest average returns are observed in 
mergers attempted by acquirers with weak governance that are advised by high-
completion-ratio advisors, with median and mean returns of -2.08% and -2.84%, 
respectively.  Strong-governance acquirers that hire low-completion advisors exhibit 
median and mean announcement returns of -1.98% and -1.86%, while weak-governance 
acquirers that hire low-completion advisors exhibit median and mean announcement 
returns of -0.70% and -0.43%, respectively.   
These results suggest a strong dependence between the corporate governance of 
an acquirer and the effect that its advisor’s completion expertise has on the acquirer’s 
value.  For acquirers with strong corporate governance, an advisor’s completion expertise 
contributes to value-creation.  For acquirers with weak governance, an advisor’s 
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completion expertise results in greater destruction of the acquirer’s value.  Overall, it 
appears that completion expertise can be both a virtue and a vice.   
Our results, however, raise questions about the essence of completion expertise.  
With regards to the value-increasing effect of completion expertise, we identify several 
non-mutually exclusive possibilities.  First, completion expertise may involve efficient 
and effective facilitation of completion of announced merger attempts that reduces 
expenses associated with these mergers, reduces the likelihood of raising offer prices, or 
prevents the success of alternative bidders.  Second, completion expertise may also 
involve successful screening of mergers before they are announced and proceeding with 
announcement of only those mergers that are likely to create value for the acquirer.  By 
doing so, advisors help acquirers avoid the costs of announcing and pursuing acquisitions 
that are unlikely to be completed or create value.  Regardless of the channel of expertise, 
the evidence indicates that strong-governance acquirers benefit from seeking merger 
advisors with high completion ratios and following their advice.  With regards to the 
value-reducing effect of completion expertise, completion-skilled advisors may destroy 
value by overcoming the obstacles of completing value-reducing acquisitions, potentially 
by offering higher payments to target shareholders and managers.   
One big question that our results raise is whether there is a causal relation 
between an advisor’s prior completion ratio and an acquirer’s announcement stock 
returns.  An alternative possibility is that some investment banks or groups of investment 
banks consistently service mergers with a higher probability of completion.  To ascertain 
whether the identity of the actual advisor affects acquirer announcement returns, we 
perform an array of placebo tests.  Specifically, we match the actual advisor that served 
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on the merger with alternative advisors that are similar according to market share and 
industries of clients that these advisors work with.  We then test the relation between the 
alternative advisors’ prior completion ratios and acquirers’ announcement returns.  If 
self-selection into high-completion-likelihood mergers drives results and not the identity 
and effort by the actual advisor, we would expect the relations between the alternative 
(“placebo”) advisor’s completion ratios and acquirer’s returns to be similar to those 
observed for the actual (“treatment”) advisor.  We find no significant relation between 
placebo completion ratios and acquirer returns.  The difference in the observed relation 
between the treatment and placebo groups is statistically significant for tests that involve 
acquirers with strong governance, and insignificant – but with a p-value of 0.128 – for 
tests that involve acquirers with weak governance.  Overall, the results are consistent 
with a value-increasing effect of completion expertise for acquirers with strong corporate 
governance.   
This study contributes to three branches of existing literature.  First, our results 
provide new insight into the effect of completion-focused advisor fee structure on advisor 
incentives to increase value, originally raised by McLaughlin (1990) and Rau (2000).  In 
an attempt to shed light on the quandary identified by Rau, our results show that the 
seeming focus on the merger completion expertise of advisors is, for acquirers with 
strong governance, consistent with value-maximizing behavior.  For acquirers with weak 
corporate governance, however, the focus on merger completion expertise of advisors 
results in value destruction.   
Second, we add to the discussion of the nature of advisor expertise in mergers and 
acquisitions.  Bao and Edmans (2011) show evidence of advisor expertise in the form of a 
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“bank fixed effect” that can explain variation in acquirer announcement returns.  Our 
study uncovers an observable expertise, potentially a component of this fixed effect: 
namely, an advisor’s completion of a high percentage of announced mergers.  Golubov, 
Petmezas, and Travlos (2012) find that top-tier investment bank advisors—those with the 
highest market share during their sample period—are associated with higher 
announcement period returns when the target is publicly traded.  Our measure of advisor 
expertise—the ability to complete announced mergers—shows evidence of value-creating 
expertise that is not limited only to top-tier advisors and mergers involving public targets.  
Kale, Kini and Ryan (2003) find that advisor market share can proxy for value-creating 
expertise after a merger has been announced.  In a sample of 23 tender offers, they find 
that the reputation of the bidder’s advisor is positively related to the probability of (i) 
successfully bidding on a value-creating merger, and (ii) withdrawing from an announced 
value-destroying merger.  We provide new evidence of advisor expertise that is 
observable before a merger has been announced.  In addition, completion ratio is a proxy 
for advisor skill that extends to a much broader sample of mergers. 
Finally, we build on the literature dealing with corporate governance and merger 
outcomes.  Although studies have examined merger performance and corporate 
governance (e.g., Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007), Byrd and Hickman (1992), Carline, 
Linn, and Yadav (2009)), to our knowledge ours is the first study to report evidence on 
the relation between governance and advisor expertise.  We demonstrate that one way in 
which strong corporate governance contributes to value-creation in mergers is by 
utilizing value-creating expertise of advisors.   
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 briefly summarizes 
prior studies, with a specific focus on the role of investment banks as advisors in mergers 
and acquisitions.  Section 3 describes the data and presents summary statistics.  Section 4 
examines the persistence of investment banks’ completion records and tests of the effect 
of completion ratios on acquirer’s announcement period performance.  In section 5 we 
analyze the interrelation between acquirer corporate governance and advisor expertise.  
Section 6 summarizes the findings and concludes. 
II. Literature review  
Within the existing literature on investment banking relationships in mergers and 
acquisitions, we partition relevant studies into four main categories and discuss each 
category (see, e.g., Bruner (2002) for a review of the literature on the value effects of 
mergers and acquisitions).  The first examines whether and how advisors generate value 
for their clients.  The second is concerned with how advisors help facilitate and complete 
mergers.  The third category includes studies relevant to the contingent nature of advisory 
fees.  The fourth studies how acquirer corporate governance impacts merger outcomes. 
A. An advisor’s ability to generate value for clients 
One function of a financial advisor is to help sway the outcome of a merger in the 
client’s favor.  This could be accomplished in two ways.  First, the advisor might identify 
a value-creating merger for the client, or they might dissuade the client from pursuing a 
merger that destroys value.  Rau (2000) refers to this function as the superior deal 
hypothesis.  The other way an advisor works for the benefit of the client is by negotiating 
favorable terms, given that a merger has already been identified.  Kale, Kini, and Ryan 
(2003) refer to this second function as the strategic bargaining hypothesis.   
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To date, few studies have explored heterogeneity in the ability of advisors to 
generate value for acquirers.  Bao and Edmans (2011) find evidence of advisor expertise 
in the form of persistence of performance.  They measure the cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR) of an advisor bank’s clients during the announcement of the clients’ 
acquisitions attempted over the preceding two years and find that the top quintile of 
advisor banks outperforms the bottom quintile by 0.92 percentage points over the 
subsequent two years.  Although this “advisor fixed-effect” shows evidence of expertise, 
it does not provide insight into what these advisors are doing that is skillful.  
Furthermore, the authors find limited evidence of an association between completion 
expertise and a merger’s value effects, but it is not robust; they conclude from this lack of 
evidence that there need not be a conflict between merger completion incentives and 
value maximization.  In addition, Bao and Edmans find no relation between prior client 
performance and acquirer choice of advisor, suggesting that acquirers do not consider 
prior performance when selecting an advisor.  The authors cite the M&A industry’s use 
of league tables based on market share as one possible explanation for this, and posit that 
league tables based on value creation may improve acquirers’ advisor selection decisions.   
Kale, Kini, and Ryan (2003) examine the relative reputations of acquirer and 
target advisors in tender offers, where an advisor’s reputation is defined as its market 
share in the year of the merger.  They find that hiring a more reputable advisor can help 
an acquirer capture a larger share of merger gains, consistent with the strategic bargaining 
hypothesis.  They also find that advisor reputation is positively related to the total wealth 
gain in a tender offer.  The authors also present some insight into how an advisor might 
utilize its expertise for the acquirer’s benefit.  In a sample of multi-bidder transactions 
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they find that the reputation of the acquirer’s advisor is positively related to (i) the 
probability of successfully bidding on a value-creating merger, and (ii) the probability of 
withdrawing from an announced value-destroying merger.  Although compelling, this 
evidence is highly specific—the authors’ results are limited to a sample of 23 multi-
bidder tender offers.  In addition, other studies find that Kale, Kini, and Ryan’s measure 
of advisor reputation is negatively related to acquirer value, as described in the next 
section. 
B. An advisor’s role as merger facilitator 
Another function of an advisor is to facilitate a merger by ensuring its completion.  
Rau’s (2000) deal completion hypothesis suggests that some acquirers are driven by 
empire-building considerations, use advisors to negotiate completion and “rubber-stamp” 
the merger, and disregard the effect that these transactions have on shareholder wealth.  
Rau finds that an advisor’s current market share is positively related to its prior merger 
completion ratio.  But he finds no relation between advisor market share and the post-
acquisition performance of an advisor’s prior clients.  Bao and Edmans (2011) also find 
that acquirers select advisors based on market share and not prior clients’ performance.  
Both papers argue that the evidence is consistent with the deal completion hypothesis.  
Perhaps the most troubling result, reported by these studies, is that an advisor’s market 
share is negatively related to the performance of its future clients in acquisitions.   It is 
this negative relation that questions the acquirers’ use of market share as the primary 
determinant of advisor choice in the M&A industry.   
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C. Contingent fees and merger completion incentives 
Compounding this puzzle is the contingent fee structure that is prevalent in 
advisory contracts.  McLaughlin (1990) argues that the incentives of advisors can create 
conflicts of interest with their acquirer clients.  Specifically, he finds that in a typical 
merger advisory contract, more than 80% of the advisory fee is paid only if the merger is 
completed; the fees are not contingent on increased value for the client.  McLaughlin 
speculates that the advisor’s concern for its reputation might prevent it from proposing 
and pursuing value-destroying deals for its clients.  Rau (2000) notes that in his sample, 
an average of 55% of a top-tier advisor’s fee is contingent upon completion of the 
transaction, and he identifies a positive relation between an advisor market share and the 
amount of contingent fees.  Rau cites this fee structure as an explanation for why advisor 
market share depends on merger completion and not prior client performance.   
Extant empirical evidence on the fee structure of advisory contracts concludes 
that the prevalence of contingent fees creates incentives for advisors to pursue both a high 
number and proportion of completed mergers, consistent with the facilitating role of an 
advisor as well as the deal completion hypothesis.  However, the evidence seems to 
conflict with the interests of acquiring shareholders seeking to maximize acquirer value, 
as well as with an advisor’s role as a value-creator.   
D. Acquirer corporate governance and merger outcomes 
It may not be altogether surprising that evidence of advisor value maximization 
incentives is weak, since an acquirer may not be interested in value maximization.  A 
robust body of literature discusses the potential agency problems associated with the 
separation of firm ownership and control (see, e.g., Jensen (1986), Stulz (1990)).  
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Mergers are often viewed as a vehicle for entrenched managers to build empires at the 
expense of shareholders, and corporate governance plays an important monitoring role in 
mitigating these agency problems.  Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) examine completed 
acquisitions and anti-takeover provisions (ATPs), a proxy for weak corporate 
governance.  These authors find a negative relation between acquirer announcement 
period CAR and acquirer ATPs, and they argue that ATPs protect entrenched managers 
from the disciplinary effect of the market for corporate control, thus allowing them to 
pursue value-destroying mergers.  Conversely, firms with stronger governance with fewer 
ATPs should be less likely to pursue value-destroying acquisitions. 
Carline, Linn, and Yadav (2009) analyze post-merger operating performance and 
acquirer corporate governance in the form of board characteristics.  They find that 
acquirers with larger boards are associated with lower post-merger operating 
performance, and that the presence of outside blockholders—a proxy for better outside 
monitoring—is positively associated with post-merger operating performance.  Byrd and 
Hickman (1992) also examine merger performance and acquirer board structure, and they 
find a curvilinear relationship between the proportion of outside directors and acquirer 
announcement period CARs.  Clearly, firm-level corporate governance and merger 
outcomes are related.  However, we are not aware of studies that address the interaction 
of an acquirer’s corporate governance and its financial advisor in a merger. 
Overall, although a few studies find evidence that certain advisor characteristics 
are associated with value-creation, there is little direct evidence on whether prior 
completion record is associated with value-creation.  There are also studies that suggest 
that advisors are hired to ensure merger completion, regardless of whether the merger 
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creates or destroys value.  This argument is supported in part by the evidence that advisor 
compensation is highly contingent on merger completion, and also with the view that 
mergers are a vehicle for entrenched managers to build empires at the expense of 
shareholders.  Our analysis attempts to shed light on the role and value effects of advisor 
completion record. 
III. Data and Variable Construction 
E. Data sources 
To construct our sample, we use the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) database.  We select transactions that are classified as 
a merger or acquisition, and in which the acquirer used a financial advisor.  We include 
both completed and uncompleted transactions.  Collectively, we refer to these 
transactions as mergers.  To be consistent with other studies, we focus on mergers that 
seek a change in control, and thus require that the acquirer owns not more than 50% of 
the target and seeks to own not less than 50% of the target.  These screens result in a 
sample of 4,787 merger attempts which span 1979 2007.   
If available, for each of the acquirers, we obtain daily stock returns, daily stock 
prices, and number of shares outstanding from the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) database.  We also obtain information on anti-takeover provisions of the acquirer 
from Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC).   Finally, we obtain information 
about whether an acquirer used a particular financial advisor as the lead underwriter in a 
prior equity or debt security issuance from SDC’s New Issues database. 
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F. Variable construction 
Our main variable of interest is prior completion ratio.  We measure prior 
completion ratio as the percentage of announced mergers in which the investment bank 
served as the acquirer’s advisor that were ultimately completed over a period prior to the 
announcement of the current merger.  We require that an advisor completed at least one 
merger during this measurement period.  Unfortunately, we lack theory to guide our 
choice of an appropriate interval in which to search for a correlation between the 
advisor’s completion ratio and the effect of that ratio on subsequent mergers.  Therefore, 
we conduct the analyses using prior completion ratio measured over one-year, two-year, 
and three-year periods prior to the announcement of the current merger.   
G. Sample summary statistics 
Summary statistics are presented in Table 1.  Panel A divides the sample into 
completed and uncompleted mergers, highlighting the prominent difference in the 
acquirer announcement period CAR between the two categories.  Compared with 
completed mergers, uncompleted mergers have significantly more negative acquirer 
CARs.  In line with existing literature, targets tend to experience higher announcement 
period returns than acquirers.  The mean and median of the advisor prior completion ratio 
do not differ significantly across the two categories.  In the multivariate analysis that 
follows, we examine whether advisor completion ratio can provide ex ante information 
about a merger’s likelihood of completion and the effect on acquirer value. 
IV. The Effect of Prior Completion Ratio on the Likelihood of Completion  
In this section, we examine whether prior completion ratios of advisors are 
associated with the likelihood that future mergers in which the bank serves as an 
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acquirer’s financial advisor are completed.  We undertake this analysis under the premise 
that if some advisors possess “completion expertise” associated with more likely merger 
completion, this expertise should be persistent.  That is, those advisors that completed 
more announced mergers in the past would be associated with higher likelihood of 
completion of a future merger.   
We model the likelihood of merger completion as a logistic regression where the 
dependent variable equals 1 if an announced merger is completed and 0 if uncompleted or 
withdrawn.  The explanatory variable of interest is an advisor’s prior completion ratio.  
The model includes control variables that are hypothesized to affect the likelihood of 
merger completion.  We include average acquisition returns to the advisor’s prior clients, 
the advisor’s market share, an indicator variable for whether the advisor advised on a 
prior merger to the acquirer and whether the advisor served as an underwriter to the 
acquirer, the number of prior mergers by the acquirer, the number of concurrent bidders, 
indicator variable if merger is paid by cash, an indicator variable for whether firms are in 
similar industries, the number of target industries, an indicator variable for a hostile 
takeover, and the ratio of merger value to the value of acquirer total assets.  We also 
include calendar-year indicator variables to control for possible differences in merger 
completion rates across the years.  Statistical significance in this and other regression 
models in the paper is estimated using heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-robust 
standard errors clustered at the individual investment bank level to account for the 
possibility that outcomes of acquisitions assisted by an individual bank may be 
interrelated.   
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Table 2 reports the results of these regressions.  The results reveal that the 
probability that an announced merger will be completed is positively related to the prior 
completion ratio of the acquirer’s advisor.  For each of the measurement periods, the 
coefficient estimates of completion ratios are positive and statistically significant, all with 
p-values less than 0.01.  Thus, some advisors are associated with mergers that have a 
higher likelihood of completion.  This finding is consistent with the idea that some 
advisors possess “completion expertise” in the form of the ability to complete an 
announced merger, and as expertise, it is persistent.   
V. Acquirer Value Creation, Corporate Governance, and Completion Expertise 
Our focus now turns to whether completion expertise helps create or destroy 
value.  To answer this question, we examine whether advisors with high completion 
ratios tend to advise acquirers on mergers that create more or destroy more value for the 
acquirer.   
H. The effect of completion ratio on acquirer returns 
Before we examine whether completion expertise helps create more value or 
destroy more value, it is worth asking whether there is reason to suspect that an expertise 
manifested by completion ratios can create and can destroy value.  This inadvertently 
leads us into hypotheses or arguments about the nature of completion expertise.  Thus, 
what potential expertise, in control of advisors, may result in heterogeneity in observable 
completion ratios?   
One obvious possibility is that high completion expertise advisors foster merger 
completion by offering the target better deal, offering a higher price for target shares, or 
paying a higher premium.  Holding other things equal, that should reduce acquirer gains.  
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Alternatively, advisors may foster merger completion by convincing target managers to 
collaborate and approve the merger, warding off potential alternative bidders.  These 
efforts may increase acquirer gains by keeping offer price low.  Another possibility is that 
advisors screen mergers before announcement.  Some advisors with expertise are able to 
select mergers that are unlikely to be completed and unlikely to create value, and 
convince acquirers to drop those before announcement.  This saves certain costs 
associated with announcing, pursuing, and then withdrawing a merger or completing a 
value-reducing merger.  An observable outcome of this expertise would be that mergers 
that are announced by these advisors are more likely to be completed.  Overall, there is 
sufficient reason to suggest that completion expertise may have a positive or a negative 
effect on the value of the acquirer.   
To discern whether advisor completion expertise has value implications, we 
examine the effect of the advisor’s prior completion ratio on acquirer announcement 
period returns.  The dependent variable is acquirer CAR in the 3 days ( 1; +1) 
surrounding the merger announcement.  Excess returns are computed as the stock return 
over the announcement period minus the return on a benchmark portfolio over the same 
period.  Benchmark portfolios are 25 Fama-French value-weighted portfolios, 
constructed by independently sorting stocks according to size and book-to-market 
characteristics.  Besides prior completion ratio, the regression model includes variables 
that control for acquirer’s acquisition expertise and the complexity of the merger.  These 
include prior client acquisition returns, advisor market share, an indicator variable for 
whether there were prior relations between advisor and acquirer, the number of other 
bidders, an indicator variable for whether the merger was paid in cash, an indicator 
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variable for merger with the acquirer and target operating in similar industries, acquirer 
assets and cash flow, total merger value, and an indicator variable for whether the merger 
was considered hostile. 
The results of these acquirer return regressions are presented in Table 3.  The 
coefficient estimates of prior completion ratio are all statistically insignificant, regardless 
of the measurement interval.  For the full sample, therefore, it appears that advisor 
completion expertise has no value implications for acquirers.  That is, for an average 
acquirer, advisors with strong completion expertise neither create not destroy value.   
I. The effect of completion ratio on returns of acquirers with strong and weak 
corporate governance 
It is possible, however, that the insignificant relation between completion ratio 
and acquirer returns observed in the full sample masks a certain heterogeneity in the 
effect of completion expertise on value among acquirers.  Acquirer managers may have 
differing incentives, with some striving to create value for shareholders while others are 
focused on perquisite consumption, and existing literature provides some evidence of 
these disparate incentives.  Firms with weak corporate governance – in the form of more 
extensive use of anti-takeover provisions or the absence of outside blockholders– 
experience lower acquirer stock returns at the announcement and lower post-merger 
operating performance (Masulis, Wang, and Xie, 2007; Carline, Linn, and Yadav, 2009).  
These findings are consistent with the idea that managers of acquirers with weaker 
corporate governance have fewer incentives to maximize value and are more likely to 
engage in perquisite consumption, possibly in the form of building empires even at the 
expense of shareholders.  Thus, we examine the effect of completion ratio on returns of 
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acquirers with potentially different incentives, measured by the level of corporate 
governance of these acquirers.   
In this subsection, we examine the effect of completion ratios on acquirer returns 
for acquirers with strong corporate governance and acquirers with weak corporate 
governance.  We identify acquirers with strong corporate governance and those with 
weak governance using the G index of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), which 
measures the number of firm ATPs.  The strong (weak) governance sub-sample consists 
of firms with G-index values in the bottom (top) tercile, because a higher firm G-index 
implies stronger managerial power and weaker governance.   
Table 4 presents summary statistics for the announcement period CAR of 
acquirers with strong and weak corporate governance.  Each sub-sample is further 
divided according to the completion ratio of the acquirer’s advisor: “high” completion 
advisors have 2-year completion ratios above the sample median, and “low” completion 
advisors are below the sample median.  For acquirers with weak governance, median and 
mean announcement returns are negative and significantly different from zero when a 
high-completion advisor is employed.  Announcement returns are negative, but 
insignificantly different from zero if a low completion advisor is employed by a weak-
governance acquirer.  For acquirers with strong corporate governance, the median and 
mean announcement returns are positive if a high-completion advisor is employed, with 
mean returns significantly different from zero.  If a low-completion advisor is employed, 
both median and mean returns are negative and significantly different from zero.  This 
evidence suggests that the combination of a weak-governance acquirer with a high-
completion advisor—or a strong-governance acquirer with a low-completion advisor—
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results in a significant destruction of wealth for the acquirer.  Only mergers by strong-
governance acquirers advised by high-completion advisors, on average, create value for 
acquirers.   
To formalize our analysis, we estimate acquirer return regressions for the strong 
and weak governance sub-samples; results are reported in Table 5.  For brevity, we report 
regressions that include completion ratio measured over 2-year and 3-year periods prior 
to the current merger.  For the sub-sample of mergers attempted by acquirers with weak 
governance, the coefficients of completion ratio are negative, albeit statistically 
significant only for the longest 3-year measurement period, with a p-value of 0.10.  For 
the sub-sample of mergers attempted by acquirers with strong governance, the 
coefficients of completion ratio are all positive and statistically significant, with p-values 
of less than 0.01 and less than 0.05 for the 2-year and 3-year measurement periods.  
These results reinforce conclusions from our analysis of summary statistics.  That is, 
advisor completion expertise appears to create value for acquirers with strong corporate 
governance, while it fosters value destruction in acquirers with weak corporate 
governance.   
J. Discussion of completion expertise 
Our results suggest that advisors with merger completion expertise facilitate 
mergers that create more value for those acquirer clients that have strong governance.  
But what exactly is it about completion expertise that contributes to value creation?  We 
propose two non-mutually exclusive explanations.   
First, completion expertise may be representative of an advisor’s ability to 
complete mergers more efficiently.  This efficiency may involve reducing merger 
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expenses, such as arranging less costly financing; ceteris paribus, such cost savings 
would add value to a merger.  Completion expertise might also be representative of the 
advisor’s ability to help the acquirer avoid having to raise its initial offering price, either 
through effective valuation of the target or by preventing the success of other potential 
bidders.   
Second, it is possible that advisors with completion expertise are able to screen 
out certain unfavorable mergers before they are announced and proceed with announcing 
only those mergers that are likely to create value for the acquirer.  The assumption is that 
skilled advisors can identify mergers that are either value-destroying or unlikely to be 
completed before they are announced.  As shown in Table 1, mergers that do not get 
completed tend to be more value-destructive; thus, advisors skilled at screening out such 
mergers would be consistent with the observed positive relation between advisor 
completion ratio and acquirer announcement period returns.  These two explanations are 
not mutually exclusive, and likely complement each other.   
For acquirers with weak corporate governance, completion expertise may 
represent an advisor’s ability to ensure merger completion, even at the cost of acquirer 
value (Rau 2000).  For instance, the advisor may ensure completion by setting a high 
offer price, lucrative payments to target managers, and generally spending too much on 
the acquisition.  This, of course, reduces acquirer gains, but helps ensure merger 
completion.   
K. Alternative explanations and placebo tests 
One could argue that the persistence of completion ratios is due to some banks 
that consistently self-select into mergers which are more likely to be completed.  At the 
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core of the self-selection problem is the assumption that certain advisors consistently 
advise mergers that are more likely to be completed.  That is, any advisor from this group 
would be associated with high completion and a certain effect on the value of acquirers.  
Two characteristics that may be associated with more likely completion are the advisor’s 
market share and the industry of the assets that are the object of the merger, i.e. the 
industry of the target.  Most other merger characteristics are either acquirer-specific or 
potentially under the influence of the advisor.   
To examine whether self-selection explains our results, we run “placebo” tests on 
acquirer return regressions.  In these placebo tests, we substitute the information and 
characteristics of the actual advisor with characteristics of an alternative advisor that is 
similar to the actual one.  Under the self-selection explanation, it is not the identity of the 
advisor but the fact that the advisor belongs to a certain group of advisors that drives the 
results.  Thus, placebo tests should produce results similar to those produced by tests with 
actual advisors.   
We identify alternative advisors according to several criteria.  First, we calculate 
the market share of investment banks over three years prior to the current merger, and for 
each merger, randomly choose one of ten investment banks with the market shares closest 
to that of the actual advisor.  Second, we randomly choose an investment bank that over 
the prior 3 years advised an acquirer in a merger with a target operating in the same 2-
digit SIC industry as the target of the current merger.   
In Table 6, we report coefficient estimates of completion ratio from placebo 
acquirer return regressions alongside those obtained from regressions using the actual 
advisor.  The reported results are for placebo advisors identified using the market share 
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approach.  Results using the target industry approach are similar and are not reported for 
brevity.  All of the coefficients using placebo advisors are negative and insignificant.  
The difference in the coefficients between actual and placebo advisors is statistically 
significant for mergers attempted by acquirers with strong governance (low G-index) but 
insignificant (although with a p-value of .128 for the completion ratio measured over 
prior 3-years) for mergers attempted by acquirers with weak governance.  Overall, the 
results are inconsistent with the alternative interpretation that self-selection of advisors by 
groups with certain market share or those specializing in mergers in certain industries is 
driving the results.   
The results are also unlikely to be explained by the self-selection of advisors into 
mergers that create more value for acquirers.  One reason against this self-selection is that 
the effect of completion ratios on value differs between acquirers with strong governance 
and acquirers with weak governance.  Additionally, the coefficients of completion ratio 
are estimated using models that control for average value created for acquirers in prior 
acquisitions which the advisor was involved in.   
L. Advisor expertise across investment bank tiers 
We now investigate whether completion ratio is associated with value creation 
across top-tier and non-top-tier advisors, in the context of corporate governance.  
Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos (2012) present evidence that top-tier investment banks 
are associated with more value created in public acquisitions only.  Results we have 
presented so far are not restricted to top-tier advisors, and our evidence indicates that 
merger completion expertise is associated with value creation for both public and private 
targets.   
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In our full sample of mergers, we observe a significant negative correlation 
between advisor completion ratio and market share—that is, the top-tier banks tend to 
complete a lower proportion of announced mergers than other banks.  At face value, this 
correlation would suggest that smaller banks possess better merger completion expertise 
than top-tier banks.  To examine whether differences in advisor expertise across banking 
tiers are driving our results, we further sub-divide acquirers with strong and weak 
governance according to whether or not they hired a top-tier investment bank advisor.  
We define top-tier banks as those in the top decile of market share in a given year.  We 
then run our main regression of acquirer CAR on advisor completion ratio and control 
variables for these sub-samples of observations sorted by advisor tiers and acquirer 
governance levels.  In unreported results, we observe that acquirer returns are positively 
related to advisor completion ratio only if the firm has good corporate governance, in 
both the top-tier advisor and non-top-tier advisor sub-samples.  These results suggest 
heterogeneity in advisor expertise across banking tiers.  The results also imply that strong 
governance complements advisor skill regardless of whether or not an acquirer hires a 
top-tier advisor.  
VI. Conclusions 
We examine the value implications of acquirers’ focus on merger completion and 
the accompanying incentives they provide investment bank advisors, and we report 
several main findings.  Investment banks’ expertise in completing mergers is persistent; 
banks with a strong prior track record of completing mergers are associated with more 
likely completion of mergers announced in the future.  We also find a positive relation 
between an investment bank advisor’s prior completion ratio and its acquirer client’s 
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announcement period returns for acquirers with strong corporate governance, measured 
by the level of anti-takeover provisions of the acquirer.  We also find some evidence that 
the relation between advisors’ completion ratios and acquirers’ acquisition returns is 
negative for acquirers with weak corporate governance.  These patterns remain similar in 
top-tier and non-top-tier sub-samples.   
Our results suggest that advisor completion ratio is a robust proxy for potentially 
value-creating advisor expertise; to our knowledge, this proxy has not been seriously 
considered by existing literature, which focuses primarily on advisor market share.  
Overall, the results show that the focus on merger completion can be consistent with 
value maximization.  That is, some investment banks possess expertise in facilitating 
mergers that create more value for their acquirer clients, which manifests itself in a 
higher record of completing announced mergers assisted by these advisors.  Exactly how 
merger completion expertise drives value creation is not clear.  It is possible that 
completion expertise is indicative of an advisor’s ability to reduce merger expenses and 
prevent offering price increases. It is also possible that skilled advisors are able to 
identify (and thus avoid) value-destroying mergers before they are announced.  Future 
studies on the specific nature of an advisor’s ability to create value in mergers would be 
illuminating.   
Importantly, the evidence indicates that acquirers and their incentives play an 
important role in their decision to use advisor expertise.  While completion expertise is 
potentially value-increasing, it may also destroy value if an acquirer’s incentives are ex 
ante misaligned with value-maximization.  The evidence is consistent with the idea that 
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advisors are employed by acquirers and act according to the mandate that acquirer 
managers delegate.   
Finally, the evidence implies that the seeming inefficiency and conflict of 
interests embedded in advisory contracts suggested by McLaughlin (1990) may, in fact, 
be efficient.  By contracting advisory fees to be contingent on deal completion, acquirers 
may be providing incentives for banks to help them pursue better mergers.  On the other 
hand, contingent fees also appear consistent with the goals of acquirers that pursue 
mergers for purposes of empire-building.  The focus on completion is value-increasing 
only for acquirers with strong governance.  Consequently, the reasons for an acquirer’s 
provision of merger completion incentives may differ according to the acquirer’s 
motivations.  More research, however, is needed to examine the efficiency of contingent 
advisor compensation. 
 
Essay 2: Investment Banks and their Affiliated Mutual Funds: International Evidence 
from IPO Allocations 
VII. Introduction  
In this study, we examine a potential conflict of interest between the investment 
banking and asset management divisions of financial services firms worldwide.  
Specifically, we look at how investment banks allocate IPOs to their affiliated mutual 
funds, given their informational advantage about the quality of the IPO prior to the 
offering.  A bank could allocate hot IPOs to affiliated funds in an effort to improve fund 
returns and increase management fee income, which existing literature calls the nepotism 
hypothesis (Ritter and Zhang, 2007).  On the other hand, banks may use affiliated mutual 
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funds as a means to subscribe cold IPOs to preserve investment banking fee income at the 
expense of fund shareholders, known as the dumping ground hypothesis.   
Ritter and Zhang study this issue in the U.S., and their empirical results yield 
mixed evidence.  The authors find limited support for the nepotism hypothesis, but only 
during the Internet bubble period of 1999-2000 when the overall IPO market was very 
strong.  Their study focuses on IPOs in a country with a highly developed stock market 
and strong investor protection; in the U.S., Rule 10f-3 of the Investment Company Act of 
1940 is in place for the express purpose of preventing IPO dumping.  Although Ritter and 
Zhang’s work is groundbreaking, it may also be illuminating to explore cross-country 
differences in IPO allocations involving mutual funds that are affiliated with IPO 
underwriters.  Variation in country-level institutions that protect investors could provide 
insight into whether underwriters are favoring or taking advantage of affiliated mutual 
fund shareholders. 
We analyze IPO allocations to affiliated mutual funds in 24 countries during the 
period covering 1999-2009.  We test the effect of cross-country variation in investor 
protection on IPO allocations to mutual funds affiliated with the offering’s lead 
underwriter (or “affiliated mutual funds”).  One of our goals is to identify country-level 
investor protection measures that either mitigate or aggravate the conflict of interest 
between a financial firm’s investment banking and asset management divisions.  Such an 
exploration may shed light on whether and how financial conglomerates use IPO 
allocations take advantage of mutual fund investors, and what might be done to prevent 
it. 
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We begin our analysis by comparing IPO first-day returns (or “initial returns”) 
across countries.  Initial return represents the degree to which an IPO is underpriced; any 
investors who receive allocations of underpriced IPOs capture the gains from this 
underpricing.  In Europe and the Asia-Pacific region, we find that IPOs purchased by 
mutual funds that are affiliated with the offering’s lead underwriter (we call these 
offerings “affiliated IPOs”) have significantly lower initial returns than IPOs not 
purchased by an affiliated fund.  In contrast, IPOs purchased by affiliated funds in the 
United States tend to perform significantly better, consistent with Ritter and Zhang’s 
(2007) univariate results.  Next, we look at how country-level measures of investor 
protection are associated with initial returns.  We utilize common measures of investor 
protection employed by existing literature, including a country’s legal origin and indices 
of anti-self dealing regulations, disclosure requirements, prospectus liability, and judicial 
system quality.  Both affiliated and non-affiliated IPOs have significantly higher initial 
returns in countries with strong investor protection.   
Interestingly, across all measures of strong and weak investor protection, 
affiliated IPOs have lower mean initial returns than IPOs not purchased by affiliated 
mutual funds.  This evidence suggests that affiliated mutual fund shareholders may be 
missing out on their affiliated underwriter’s best IPOs, consistent with the dumping 
ground hypothesis.  However, simple mean comparisons provide only a rough picture, so 
we turn to multivariate analysis. 
We next examine the determinants of an IPO’s initial return.  After controlling for 
relevant deal characteristics, we find that IPOs purchased by affiliated mutual funds are 
associated with significantly lower first-day returns, consistent with the dumping ground 
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hypothesis.  We also find that stronger investor protection is associated with higher initial 
returns, benefiting fund investors.  This result is robust to multiple measures of investor 
protection.  Furthermore, the interaction between strong investor protection and 
allocations to affiliated mutual funds is positive and significant—in other words, the 
positive effect of strong investor protection appears to offset the negative relation 
between allocations to affiliates and IPO initial returns.  This result highlights how 
country-level governance mechanisms may mitigate one conflict of interest within 
financial conglomerates.  Specifically, strong investor protection appears to prevent IPO 
dumping.   
Finally, we examine how IPOs are allocated to affiliated mutual funds.  In 
particular, we are interested in whether cold IPOs—those with negative initial returns—
are more likely to be allocated to affiliates, as these IPOs seem most likely to be 
undersubscribed and prone to dumping.  Interestingly, we find a negative association 
between investor protection measures and the likelihood that an IPO is purchased by an 
affiliated mutual fund—that is, an IPO in a country with strong investor protection is less 
likely to be allocated to an affiliated mutual fund.  Furthermore, the interaction between 
strong investor protection and cold IPOs is negative and significant.  In other words, cold 
IPOs are even less likely to be allocated to affiliates when investor protection is stronger.  
It appears that stronger protection dissuades the underwriter from dumping a cold IPO on 
its affiliated mutual funds, consistent with our argument that strong investor protection 
can prevent IPO dumping. 
Finally, we compare the long-run performance of affiliated IPOs to offerings not 
allocated to affiliates.  Although both of these categories of IPO tend to underperform 
30 
 
 
 
various benchmarks in the long run, we find no significant differences between the 
underperformance of affiliated and unaffiliated IPOs. 
This study contributes to existing literature in two areas.  First, our results build 
on the relationship between investment banks and their affiliated mutual funds.  We show 
new evidence consistent with the dumping ground hypothesis, representing empirical 
support for a conflict of interest between underwriters and shareholders of their affiliated 
mutual funds.  Prior literature has not found robust evidence of this conflict.  Second, our 
analysis provides new insight into cross-country variation in IPO underpricing.  Country-
level measures of investor protection have explanatory power for IPO first-day returns, 
and strong investor protection appears to offset the negative impact of affiliations 
between underwriters and mutual funds.  In other words, investor protection may prevent 
IPO dumping, benefiting mutual fund investors.  This evidence highlights the importance 
of effective regulation in dealing with conflicts of interest within financial firms.  As 
banks continue to expand the scope of their activities, new potential conflicts will arise, 
meaning that policymakers must continually strive to understand client interests so that 
they may be protected.  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 
briefly reviews relevant literature.  Section 3 describes the data.  Section 4 examines IPO 
initial returns, affiliations, and investor protection.  Section 5 covers long-run IPO 
performance, and section 6 concludes. 
VIII. Literature Review 
A few studies have examined IPO allocations to mutual funds affiliated with the 
offering’s lead underwriter.  As mentioned above, Ritter and Zhang (2007) lay the 
groundwork for our study.  They analyze U.S. IPOs purchased by mutual funds between 
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1990 and 2001.  The results in their study are mixed; there is no robust support for either 
hypothesis.  The authors find limited evidence supporting the nepotism hypothesis, 
particularly during the Internet bubble period of 1999-2000.  During periods when the 
overall IPO market is hot, IPOs purchased by funds affiliated with the lead underwriter 
are associated with higher initial returns.  In other years, the relationship is insignificant.  
Ritter and Zhang provide insight into how affiliated IPOs are allocated to mutual funds in 
a country with a highly developed stock market and strong investor protection.  Their 
study provides a foundation for our investigation of how this potential conflict of interest 
between investment banks and their affiliated funds might vary across different economic 
and regulatory environments. 
Ber, Yafeh, and Yosha (2001) examine a small sample of 128 Israeli IPOs, and 
they find that IPOs purchased by affiliated funds have significantly lower returns if the 
affiliated bank is also a lender to the IPO firm.  If the bank is not a lender, then affiliate-
purchased IPOs do not realize poorer performance.  Although their analysis is limited to a 
small sample from a single Middle-Eastern country, the results of Ber, Yafeh, and Yosha 
suggest that there may be circumstances under which banks favor other business lines at 
the expense of mutual fund shareholders. 
Johnson and Marietta-Westberg (2009) also look at the relationship between 
equity IPO underwriters and affiliated mutual funds, but their main concentration is on 
stocks purchased on the secondary market by funds affiliated with the underwriter.  The 
authors argue that banks may use affiliated mutual funds to purchase shares of poorly-
performing IPO clients in an effort to win future underwriting business from that client.  
In addition, they find some evidence that funds can gain an informational advantage from 
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their underwriter affiliates, similar to the nepotism hypothesis of Ritter and Zhang (2007).  
Johnson and Marietta-Westberg’s results suggest that affiliation with an investment bank 
can result in both a conflict of interest as well as an informational advantage. 
There are differing viewpoints about how cross-country investor protection is 
related to affiliated IPO initial returns.  Boulton, Smart, & Zutter (2010) argue that strong 
investor protection increases the ability of outside blockholders to monitor managers, 
building on Brennan and Frank’s (1997) model based on reduced monitoring incentives.  
Managers respond by setting an artificially low price for the firm’s IPO, which creates 
excess demand for the offering and thus prevents a single investor from receiving a large 
block of shares of the offering.  IPO underpricing thus results in oversubscription and 
more diffuse ownership, reducing shareholders’ incentive to monitor and helping 
managers protect their private benefits of control.  Consequently, Boulton, Smart, & 
Zutter contend that strong investor protection should be associated with greater IPO 
underpricing, or higher initial returns.  Consistent with this rationale, the authors find that 
underpricing is higher in countries with stronger investor protection.  They employ 
standard country-level measures of investor protection, including the anti-director rights 
index of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (“LLSV”) (1998), and the anti-
self-dealing index of Djankova, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (“DLLS”) 
(2008).   
Engelen and van Essen (2010) claim that strong investor protection reduces 
uncertainty about managerial decisions that decrease firm value.  Lower uncertainty 
means that firms are able to offer shares at a smaller discount; thus, Engalen and van 
Essen argue that strong investor protection can be associated with lower levels of IPO 
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underpricing and lower initial returns.  They find a negative relationship between IPO 
underpricing and many of the same investor protection measures used by Boulton, Smart, 
and Zutter.  Egelen and van Essen use hierarchical linear modeling in their analysis, 
arguing that IPOs from the same country naturally fall into a hierarchical structure.  
Banerjee, Dai, and Shrestha (2011) also find that IPO underpricing is negatively 
associated with mechanisms relating to contract enforcement and litigation risk, 
measured by the anti-self-dealing index of DLLS (2008) and prospectus liability index of 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (“LLS”) (2006), respectively. 
The disparity in the evidence presented by these studies suggests that the 
relationship between IPO underpricing and investor protection has not yet been resolved.  
One of our aims is to explore this relationship further by anchoring it to a potential 
conflict of interest between participating agents—i.e., underwriters and their affiliated 
mutual funds.  
More general studies of IPO underpricing abound, going back at least as far as 
Rock’s (1986) model based on information asymmetry between informed and 
uninformed investors.   As described above, Brennan and Franks (1997) present a model 
to explain why IPO underpricing is so prevalent.  In their model, managers seek to avoid 
monitoring by outside blockholders.  To do this, they offer underpriced shares to ensure 
excess demand for an IPO, leading to oversubscription, allowing the offering to be 
divided into smaller allocations to bidders, and ultimately more diffuse ownership among 
those initially allocated shares of the offering.  The authors argue that managers use 
underpricing   as a tool to avoid monitoring and maintain control of the firm.  Liu and 
Ritter (2011) show that the market for equity IPO underwriting consists of local 
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oligopolies, since banks do not seem to compete on price.  Lowry, Officer, and Schwert 
(2010) examine a return period of 21 days from the offer, much longer than the typical 
measure of underpricing.  They find that return volatility is higher among firms with 
more information asymmetry, highlighting the challenge faced by underwriters in valuing 
issuers.  Carter and Manaster (1990) develop a metric for ranking underwriter reputations 
based on underwriters’ relative positions in U.S. tombstone announcements.  They find 
that underwriter prestige is associated with less risky, lower-return IPOs, where IPO 
return is measured in the first two weeks following the announcement.  Megginson and 
Weiss (1991) construct an underwriter reputation measure based on market share, and 
although their study focuses on venture capital-backed IPOs, they find that underpricing 
for IPOs without VC backing is negatively related to underwriter market share, consistent 
with Carter and Manaster (1990).  In contrast, Hoberg (2007) measures underwriter 
quality based on a bank’s prior record of IPO initial returns, and he finds that a strong 
prior record of IPO underpricing is associated with higher future IPO initial returns. 
Another relevant segment of the finance literature deals with conflicts of interest 
between different business lines of the same financial institution.  Because banks are 
providing an ever-widening scope of services, this field is quite broad, and Mehran and 
Stulz (2007) provide a general review.  The most relevant of these studies are those that 
specifically address conflicts of interest between mutual funds and their affiliates.  Reuter 
(2006) analyzes the relationship between IPO allocations to mutual funds and prior 
brokerage commissions paid by the funds to the IPO’s lead underwriter.  He finds a 
positive relationship between brokerage commissions paid and IPO allocations.  This 
relationship is limited to IPOs with non-negative first-day returns, consistent with the 
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intuition that a bookrunner must look beyond its most favored clients in order to 
subscribe a cold IPO.  Most relevant to our study, Reuter finds that this relationship holds 
whether or not the fund is affiliated with the underwriter, suggesting that IPO allocations 
are “for sale” to both affiliated and non-affiliated mutual funds.  Jenkinson and Jones’ 
(2009) survey of institutional investors shows that money managers’ perceptions of 
factors affecting IPO allocations are consistent with Reuter’s results—institutional 
investors view brokerage relationships as highly important for determining IPO 
allocations. 
Equity IPOs are not the only channel through which mutual funds and their 
affiliates interact.  Massa and Rehman (2008) find that a mutual fund tends to buy more 
stock in firms that borrow from the fund’s affiliated bank.  These stocks tend to 
outperform similar stocks with no lending relationship between firm and affiliated bank.  
The authors argue that the bank gains an informational advantage about the firm as a 
result of the due diligence associated with the lending relationship, which the bank uses 
to benefit its affiliated mutual funds.  This evidence is in line with the nepotism 
hypothesis.  Funds may also benefit from affiliated research analysts.  Guidola and Molin 
(2009) find that an analyst is likely to assign more favorable ratings to stocks recently 
purchased by mutual funds affiliated with that analyst.  These stocks tend to realize 
positive abnormal returns, further evidence that affiliates can be beneficial to mutual 
funds. 
Overall, existing literature presents evidence that relationships exist among IPO 
initial return, affiliations between underwriters and mutual funds, and investor protection.  
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However, conflicting results within these studies highlight the ongoing debate over the 
nature of these relationships. 
IX. Data and Summary Statistics 
M. Data Sources 
We use the Thomson SDC Platinum database to collect equity IPOs issued 
between 1999 and 2009.  We collect IPOs held by funds in countries with a substantial 
institutional investor base, as analyzed by Ferreira and Matos (2008).  We exclude unit 
offerings, American depository receipts, real estate investment trusts, closed-end funds, 
partnerships, and banks/savings & loan associations.  We obtain global mutual fund 
holdings data from the FactSet LionShares database.  Our proxy for IPO allocations 
follows existing literature.  Funds that report holdings of an IPO within 180 days of the 
offering date are considered to have been allocated the IPO.  Because our main concern is 
how IPOs are allocated to mutual funds depending on their affiliation with the 
underwriter, we consider only IPOs underwritten by investment banks that have affiliated 
mutual funds, and we also restrict our sample to IPOs held by at least one mutual fund 
(affiliated or unaffiliated) within 180 days of the offering date, consistent with Ritter and 
Zhang (2007).  We calculate initial returns using pricing data from Thomson Datastream.  
Initial return is calculated as the percentage difference between the IPO offering price 
and the closing price on the first day of trading.  In order to prevent the influence of 
outliers and data exceptions, we winsorize observations in the top and bottom one percent 
of initial return.  Our final sample consists of 2,636 IPOs from 24 countries.  Affiliated 
mutual funds report holdings of 703 of these IPOs within 180 days of the offering date.   
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We use multiple sources to identify affiliations between underwriters and mutual 
funds.  We examine annual reports, SEC filings, and company websites to obtain the 
names of asset management subsidiaries and mutual fund families.  We also perform 
manual matching, similar to Ritter and Zhang’s (2007) methodology, identifying funds 
that contain the names of prestigious financial firms, and then using the auxiliary sources 
above to confirm the matching.  In addition, we take into account major financial mergers 
and divestitures so that an acquired asset management firm is not treated as an affiliate of 
an acquiring underwriter until after the merger date.  For example, after Wells Fargo & 
Company completed its acquisition of Wachovia in October 2008, an IPO underwritten 
by Wachovia and allocated to Wells Fargo mutual funds is treated as an affiliated IPO. 
We are most interested in how the initial return of affiliated IPOs is associated 
with country-level measures of investor protection.  Investor protection can be measured 
along numerous dimensions, as evidenced by the wealth of literature on the topic.  As a 
result, we have at our disposal a sizeable set of potential investor protection measures that 
have been employed by existing literature—for example, DLLS, LLS, and LLSV alone 
each utilize over 20 distinct variables designed to measure investor protection.  Because 
we lack theory to direct how to measure investor protection and other country-level 
institutions, we use variables that are both well-known in existing literature and also 
intuitive in the context of financial firm conflicts of interest.  These data are taken from 
Andrei Shleifer’s website. 
The anti-self dealing index of DLLS (2008) is a natural proxy for investor 
protection here, as our study focuses on instances where a bank has interests on both the 
buying and selling sides of a transaction.  The anti-self dealing index measures private 
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enforcement mechanisms applicable to affiliated-party transactions, including 
transparency requirements, ease of litigation, and board approval mechanisms.  We also 
use the disclosure requirements index of LLS (2006).  More rigorous disclosure 
requirements reveal to markets more information about the terms of securities offerings 
which—according to Boulton, Smart, and Zutter (2010)—should benefit fund investors 
through higher underpricing, as managers offer IPO shares at a discount to help ensure 
diffuse equity ownership.  In addition, we employ two investor protection variables 
related to mutual fund shareholders’ recourse against the bank that manages their money.  
The first is the prospectus liability index of LLS (2006), which measures provisions 
allowing for recovery of losses from a fund’s asset manager, distributor, and accountant 
due to misleading statements in the fund’s prospectus.  Although a fund prospectus may 
not go into great detail regarding IPO allocations from an affiliated underwriter, liability 
for the content of the document is likely representative of a bank’s overall liability for 
mistreatment of mutual fund shareholders through practices such as IPO dumping.  
Finally, we use a judicial system quality index, which Khorana, Servaes, and Tufano 
(2005) develop based on LLSV (1998) variables.  This index combines elements related 
to the quality of a country’s judicial system, as well as measures of government 
corruption and risk of expropriation, so that the index is designed to capture how 
effective a country’s court system is in allowing shareholders to take legal action if they 
have not been treated fairly. 
N. Summary Statistics and Univariate Analysis 
Table 7 shows the geographic breakdown of our sample of IPOs.  Not 
surprisingly, the United States has by far the most IPOs, and also the most IPOs that were 
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purchased by affiliated mutual funds.  Some countries have very few IPOs, limiting our 
ability to conduct country-level analysis.  Hence, for the univariate results that follow we 
aggregate IPOs to the regional level (later analysis includes country-specific 
information).  Also, because U.S. IPOs may drown out relationships in other countries, 
we will treat the United States as a separate region for purposes of univariate analysis. 
We are interested in how IPO initial return is related to the affiliation between an 
IPO’s lead underwriter and the mutual funds that purchase the offering.  Table 7 
compares initial returns as well as offering proceeds for IPOs according to whether or not 
an affiliated mutual fund was allocated shares of the offering.  In Asia-Pacific and 
Europe, IPOs purchased by affiliated mutual funds have significantly lower initial returns 
than IPOs not purchased by affiliated funds.  In addition, the pattern of lower initial 
returns for affiliated IPOs is consistent for individual countries within these two regions, 
with the exception of Finland and Spain.  The evidence that affiliated mutual funds 
receive IPOs with lower initial returns than IPOs not allocated to affiliates is consistent 
with the dumping ground hypothesis.  Results in Europe and Asia-Pacific contrast 
sharply with those for the United States—IPOs purchased by affiliated funds have 
significantly higher initial returns in the U.S. than other IPOs, consistent with the 
nepotism hypothesis and the univariate results of Ritter and Zhang (2007).  Table 7 also 
shows the proportion of IPOs with positive initial returns, and the evidence is mixed.  In 
the United States, affiliated mutual funds receive a higher proportion of IPOs with 
positive initial returns—and conversely, a lower proportion of “cold” IPOs with negative 
initial returns.  The opposite is true in Europe, and affiliated funds that receive more cold 
IPOs is consistent with the dumping ground hypothesis.  Average proceeds for affiliated 
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IPOs are significantly higher in most regions, consistent with the intuition that larger 
offerings have more total proceeds available to allocate to affiliates. 
X. IPO Initial Returns, Affiliated Mutual Funds, and Investor protection 
O. IPOs, Affiliated Mutual Funds, and Investor Protection: Univariate Analysis 
 The univariate results above provide mixed messages about what kind of 
IPOs investment banks allocate to their affiliated mutual funds.  In the U.S., funds appear 
to benefit from their affiliation with equity underwriters, whereas in Asia and Europe, 
affiliated funds receive IPOs with lower initial returns.  However, these results do not 
consider other factors associated with IPO initial return, including country-level investor 
protection mechanisms, some of which are designed to mitigate the potential conflicts of 
interest within financial conglomerates. 
 Consequently, we look at affiliated and unaffiliated IPOs across different 
measures of investor protection.  Table 8 summarizes initial returns for affiliated and 
unaffiliated IPOs, which we further divide according to whether the IPO’s country of 
issue has weak or strong investor protection measures.  Legal origin is divided according 
to common (strong) and civil law (weak).  For the other measures of investor protection, 
the strong (weak) protection sub-sample consists of countries with index values above 
(below) the median value—higher index values are all indicative of stronger investor 
protection.  Looking across the rows of the table, it is clear that mean initial returns for 
affiliated IPOs are lower than those for unaffiliated IPOs.  This difference is consistent 
with the dumping ground hypothesis and holds across all measures and levels of investor 
protection.  Column 3 shows affiliated IPO initial returns for countries with strong and 
weak investor protection.  Affiliated IPOs have higher initial returns in countries with 
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strong protection, measured by the anti-self dealing, disclosure requirements, prospectus 
liability, and judicial system quality indices.  In addition, columns 5 and 6 of Table 8 
illustrate that countries with stronger investor protection have a higher proportion of IPOs 
with positive initial returns.  Although strong investor protection is generally associated 
with higher initial IPO returns, univariate results suggest that IPOs allocated to affiliated 
mutual funds have lower initial returns, in line with the dumping ground hypothesis.  
However, simple mean comparisons provide only a rough picture, so we turn to 
multivariate analysis.  
P. IPOs, Affiliated Mutual Funds, and Investor Protection: Regression Analysis 
In this section, we examine IPO initial returns and affiliations between funds and 
underwriters in a multivariate setting.  We estimate regressions using OLS where the 
dependent variable is an IPO’s initial return.  The main explanatory variable of interest is 
an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the IPO was allocated to a mutual fund 
affiliated with the offering’s lead underwriter.  By using an indicator variable, we forego 
information about the size of the allocation that each fund receives.  On the other hand, 
we also eliminate noise in the allocation, which is of particular concern because our 
measure is only a proxy for mutual funds receiving allocations of IPOs. 
The model contains control variables employed by existing literature that have 
been shown to be associated with IPO initial returns.  Price changes leading up to the 
start of trading are a strong predictor of IPO initial return (Hanley 1993), so we include 
pre-offer price adjustment, measured as the percentage difference between the midpoint 
of the initial filing price and the final offer price (Aggarwal, Prabhala, and Puri 2002).  
Firm size is measured as the natural log of total assets.  We include an indicator variable 
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that takes a value of 1 if the offering is a technology IPO, as in Ritter and Zhang (2007).  
Underwriter reputation has also been shown to be associated with IPO underpricing (e.g., 
Carter and Manaster 1990).  We employ Megginson and Weiss’ (1991) market share-
based reputation measure, because it can be computed globally with ease.  We also 
include the holdings of funds not affiliated with the IPO’s lead underwriter, as 
institutional investors may hold some private information about the offering (Aggarwal, 
Prabhala, and Puri 2002).  Cross-country variation in the development of financial 
markets has been shown to be associated with IPO initial returns, so we include the ratio 
of stock market capitalization to country GDP as a measure of stock market development 
(Loughran, Ritter, and Rydqvist 1994).  Finally, we include calendar-year indicator 
variables to control for overall time variation in the IPO market—that is, periods of 
alternating “hot” and “cold” IPO market conditions.  Throughout the paper, statistical 
significance is estimated using heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-robust standard 
errors clustered at the individual investment bank level to account for the possibility that 
IPOs underwritten by the same bank may be interrelated. 
Results are presented in column 1 of Table 9.  The coefficient on the indicator for 
purchase by an affiliated mutual fund is negative and significant, meaning that an IPO’s 
initial return is negatively related to the offering’s lead underwriter allocating shares to 
affiliated mutual funds, consistent with the dumping ground hypothesis.  Specifically, the 
allocation of an IPO to an affiliated fund is associated with an initial return that is 5% 
lower than an IPO that is not allocated to an affiliate.  Coefficients on control variables 
are generally in line with expectations and consistent with existing literature.  Pre-offer 
price adjustment has a strong positive association with IPO underpricing, consistent with 
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existing evidence, as does underwriter reputation.  Technology IPOs are also associated 
with higher initial returns. 
In line with univariate results, multivariate evidence indicates that IPOs allocated 
to affiliated mutual funds have significantly lower initial returns, consistent with the 
dumping ground hypothesis.  We next add various measures of investor protection to the 
model (described in section 3.2 above): (i) the anti-self dealing index of DLLS (2008), 
(ii) the disclosure requirements index of LLS (2006), and (iii) the prospectus liability 
index of LLS (2006).  Results are presented in columns 2 through 7 of Table 9.  The 
indicator for purchase by an affiliated mutual fund remains negative and is significant in 
four of seven specifications.  Coefficients on investor protection variables are all positive 
and significant except in one model, consistent with our interpretation of how investor 
protection measures may benefit mutual fund shareholders (both affiliated and 
unaffiliated) by being associated with higher IPO underpricing.  
We also include an interaction term between the indicator for allocations to 
affiliated mutual funds and investor protection, in order to investigate whether the 
association between investor protection and IPO initial return is different for IPOs that 
are allocated to affiliates.  This interaction term is positive and significant for the anti-self 
dealing index, disclosure requirements index, and prospectus liability index.  This 
interaction implies that the positive effect of investor protection offsets the negative 
relation between allocations to affiliates and IPO initial returns. 
The evidence suggests that IPOs allocated to affiliated mutual funds are 
associated with lower initial returns.  This association holds across multiple model 
specifications.  However, stronger investor protection appears to offset this negative 
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relation—particularly when protection is measured according to self-dealing regulations, 
disclosure requirements, prospectus liability, and judicial system quality.  These results 
are consistent with the argument that the conflict of interest we examine here can be 
mitigated by multiple country-level legal and regulatory institutions. 
An important question is whether mutual funds are worse off for being allocated 
shares of IPOs from their affiliated investment banks.  Despite the fact that IPOs 
allocated to affiliates are associated with lower initial returns than IPOs not allocated to 
affiliates, these affiliated IPOs still tend to have initial returns that are positive.  Affiliated 
IPO first-day returns are positive and significant in all regions outside of Africa (which 
has very few observations), and mean initial returns are positive and significant at the 
country level for 17 out 24 countries in our sample.  Although the evidence that affiliates 
are allocated IPOs with only less positive (as opposed to negative) initial returns may 
well be concerning from a policy perspective, it would be more alarming if affiliated IPO 
initial returns were negative, which would be evidence consistent with severe IPO 
dumping that is harmful to mutual fund shareholders.  It is precisely these IPOs with 
negative initial returns where the underwriter is likely to face the greatest challenge in 
completing the offering and also the greatest incentive to take advantage of mutual fund 
shareholders as a way to subscribe the IPO.  Consequently, these IPOs may be an area of 
focus for policymakers looking to protect fund investors from IPO dumping.  In the next 
section, we examine whether negative initial returns are associated with IPO allocations 
to affiliated mutual funds, and how investor protection affects that relationship. 
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Q. Determinants of Affiliated IPO Purchases 
As discussed above, different regulatory measures designed to mitigate bank 
conflicts of interest likely affect how banks engage in transactions with affiliates.  In the 
context of our study, that means investor protection may influence IPO allocations to 
affiliated mutual funds.  It is possible that strong investor protection impedes such 
allocations to affiliates, since more stringent regulatory and disclosure requirements may 
prevent banks from taking advantage of their potential conflict of interest, either through 
nepotism or IPO dumping.  It is also possible that strong investor protection facilitates 
IPO allocations to affiliated mutual funds, as compliance with more stringent regulations 
may provide additional transparency so that banks can engage in transactions with 
affiliates without fear of litigation or regulatory enforcement.  As described above, we are 
also particularly interested in how investor protection may be associated with the 
allocation process for IPOs with negative initial returns.  Such cold IPOs are where 
evidence of harmful IPO dumping would manifest. 
To test these associations, we model a logistic regression where the dependent 
variable is our indicator variable for IPO allocations to affiliated mutual funds.  Our main 
explanatory variable is an indicator that takes a value of 1 if an IPO has a negative initial 
return, to see if cold IPOs are associated with allocations to affiliated mutual funds.  We 
also include the same investor protection variables as those utilized above, as well as an 
interaction term between investor protection and the cold IPO indicator.  If investor 
protection is effective in preventing IPO dumping on affiliates, then this interaction term 
should be positive and significant.  Control variables are the same as those in the previous 
section.  
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Results are presented in Table 10.  The coefficient for cold IPOs is weakly 
significant in only one of the eight models; thus, we do not observe compelling evidence 
that cold IPOs are more likely to be allocated to affiliated mutual funds.  Coefficients on 
all but one of the investor protection measures are negative and significant, signifying a 
negative relation between the likelihood that an IPO is allocated to an affiliated mutual 
fund and country-level investor protection.  The interaction between the cold IPO 
indicator and investor protection is also negative and significant for three of four investor 
protection measures.  This negative interaction suggests that cold IPOs are even less 
likely to be allocated to affiliated mutual funds than IPOs that do not have negative initial 
returns.  If investor protection measures are effective, then it is conceivable that such 
measures reduce the likelihood that underwriters will dump IPOs on their affiliated 
mutual funds.   
Other coefficients are generally in line with expectations.  The coefficient on pre-
offer price adjustment is positive and significant, suggesting that an IPO that has a price 
run-up prior to the offering date is more likely to be allocated to an affiliated mutual 
fund.  This relationship has intriguing implications that are discussed in the next section.  
In addition, technology IPOs are more likely to be purchased by affiliated mutual funds.   
Overall, our analysis of the determinants of IPO allocations to affiliated mutual 
funds shows no support of serious IPO dumping on affiliates—that is, we do not find 
evidence that underwriters are more likely to allocate cold IPOs to their affiliated mutual 
funds.  We do observe that the association between allocations to affiliates and investor 
protection is negative; furthermore, this association is significantly more negative when 
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an IPO has a negative initial return.  In other words, strong investor protection appears to 
deter the dumping of cold IPOs on affiliates. 
R. IPO Pre-Offer Price Adjustments 
We further analyze the allocation process by focusing on how an IPO’s price 
changes before the shares are offered to the market.  Hanley (1993) finds that pre-offer 
price adjustments are a strong predictor of IPO initial return, and the robustly positive 
coefficient on price adjustment in Table 9 agrees with this contention. Also, underwriters 
are certainly more likely to have better information about pre-offer price adjustments than 
outsiders.  Because IPO allocations are determined before the offer is finalized, 
relationships between price adjustments and allocations to affiliated mutual funds may be 
indicative of whether banks use their informational advantage for the benefit of fund 
shareholders.  Indeed, in Table 10 we report a positive relation between pre-offer price 
adjustment and allocations to affiliated mutual funds, and our interpretation is that IPOs 
with greater pre-offer price run-ups are more likely to be allocated to affiliates, consistent 
with the nepotism hypothesis.  Thus, we re-estimate regressions using pre-offer price 
adjustment as the dependent variable.  Results are presented in Table 11 and show the 
same positive relation between price adjustment and allocations to affiliated funds.  The 
indicator for the offering being purchased by an affiliated fund remains positive and 
significant in all specifications.  Coefficients on investor protection measures are mixed 
and generally not significant.  It does not appear that price adjustment is strongly 
associated with investor protection, although the relation between investor protection and 
price adjustment is not one that has strong implications for testing our main hypotheses.   
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In some ways, the positive relation between price adjustment and allocations to 
affiliated funds contrasts with our findings from Section 4.1 that IPO allocations to 
affiliates are associated with lower initial returns.  Based on the results in Tables 10 and 
11, it seems that banks attempt to use their informational advantage (knowledge of pre-
offer price adjustment) to benefit affiliated fund shareholders, as higher adjustment is 
associated with a higher probability that the offering will be allocated to an affiliate.  But 
it would not appear that banks’ efforts are effective, as IPOs allocated to affiliates are 
associated with lower initial returns.  More research on investment banks and pre-offer 
price adjustments could improve our understanding of the allocation process. 
XI. Long-Run Performance of IPOs Allocated to Affiliates 
Finally, we examine the long-run performance of IPOs that are allocated to 
affiliated mutual funds.  We calculate the 3-year buy and hold return for IPOs in our 
sample.  We also compare these 3-year returns to two benchmarks: (i) the return on the 
offering’s Fama French size decile portfolio, and (ii) the CRSP value-weighted index.  
Results are presented in Table 12 and do not show any significant differences in long-run 
performance for affiliated versus unaffiliated IPOs.  The pattern of long-run IPO 
underperformance appears to be present across all IPOs in our sample, consistent with 
existing literature (Foerster and Karolyi 2000, Ritter and Welch 2002).  However, it does 
not appear that mutual funds are systematically allocated IPOs with better or worse long-
run performance from their underwriter affiliates. 
XII. Conclusion 
Financial conglomerates with both equity underwriting and asset management 
divisions face a potential conflict of interest in how they allocate IPOs to their affiliated 
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mutual funds.  The dumping ground hypothesis predicts that banks take advantage of this 
conflict by allocating cold IPOs to their affiliated mutual funds, preserving investment 
banking fees at the expense of affiliated fund shareholders.  The nepotism hypothesis 
predicts that banks favor their affiliated funds and allocate better IPOs to them to increase 
asset management fee income.  We analyze this potential conflict globally and find 
support for both hypotheses, as well as a significant role for country-level investor 
protection.  Univariate evidence is in line with the dumping ground hypothesis in Europe 
and Asia-Pacific—that is, IPO allocations to affiliated mutual funds have significantly 
lower initial returns than IPOs not allocated to affiliates.  In contrast, U.S. IPOs that are 
allocated to affiliates have significantly higher initial returns, consistent with existing 
literature and the nepotism hypothesis.  After controlling for other factors associated with 
IPO underpricing, we still observe a negative relation between initial return and 
allocations to affiliated mutual funds.  Country-level measures of investor protection are 
associated with higher initial returns, in line with Boulton, Smart, and Zutter’s (2010) 
results.  Furthermore, the positive effect of investor protection on initial return appears to 
be even stronger for IPOs that are allocated to affiliated mutual funds, consistent with the 
argument that better investor protection benefits mutual fund investors by discouraging 
underwriters from dumping IPOs on affiliated funds.   
Despite this evidence, IPO initial returns are generally positive and significant for 
affiliated IPOs.  Thus, the detrimental effect of underwriter-fund affiliation on mutual 
fund shareholders does not appear to destroy value per se; rather, it may only reduce the 
gains captured through IPO underpricing.  In fact, we do not find substantial evidence 
that cold IPOs with negative initial returns are more likely to be allocated to affiliates—
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which, if present, would be alarming evidence of IPO dumping.  Furthermore, 
underwriters appear more likely to allocate IPOs to affiliates when pre-offer price 
adjustment is higher.  Given that (i) pre-offer price adjustment is a strong predictor of 
underpricing, and (ii) underwriters typically have better knowledge of price adjustment 
before an offering than outsiders, this association seems consistent with the nepotism 
hypothesis.  However, banks’ ability to use their informational advantage to the benefit of 
affiliated mutual fund shareholders may be limited. 
The fact that we find support for both the dumping ground and nepotism 
hypotheses highlights that some questions are still unanswered.  Perhaps most 
importantly, why do affiliated mutual funds tend to receive IPOs with lower initial 
returns?  Unfortunately, our proxy for affiliated IPO allocations is not fine enough to 
investigate how the pre-offer allocation process might be working in great detail.  
Reuter’s (2006) study was pioneering in this area, but further research in the context of 
allocations to affiliates and investor protection could prove very revealing, especially 
with more granular data.  Our study also emphasizes the importance of investor 
protection in mitigating the potential conflict of interest between a financial firm’s 
investment banking and asset management divisions.  However, there is more work to be 
done in identifying the specific dimensions of investor protection that mitigate this 
conflicts of interest.   Given the evidence we have presented, this is an economically 
meaningful question for mutual fund shareholders.  Future research that addresses this 
issue would also be illuminating. 
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Table 1 
 
Summary Statistics 
 
This table reports the summary statistics.  Data are obtained from the SDC Mergers and Acquisitions 
database for mergers and acquisitions during 1979-2007. 
 
                
 Completed Mergers  Uncompleted Mergers 
 Median Mean 
Std. 
Deviation  Median Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Transaction characteristics        
Merger size, $ million 201.4 1604.0 6701.6  410.0 2652.9 8742.1 
Acquirer CAR[-1,+1] -0.87% 0.10% 0.11  -1.46% -1.62% 0.09 
Acquirer CAR[-10,+10] -0.89% 0.73% 0.19  -2.90% -2.97% 0.13 
Target CAR[-1,+1] 14.74% 19.68% 0.28  12.73% 16.25% 0.21 
Target CAR[-10,+10] 20.15% 25.65% 0.35  17.25% 21.70% 0.30 
Days to completion 109 127.14 107.04  n/a n/a n/a 
        
Acquirer advisor characteristics        
Completion ratio, 1-year 91.67% 87.75% 0.16  89.90% 84.84% 0.18 
Prior clients’ acquisition returns[-1,+1] -0.77% -0.59% 0.05  -0.48% -0.42% 0.06 
Market share, 1-year 2.48% 4.53% 0.05   2.58% 5.10% 0.06 
Number of observations  4,223    564  
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Table 2  
Determinants of the probability of merger completion 
 
This table reports the determinants of the probability that an announced merger will be completed.  Data 
are obtained from the SDC Mergers and Acquisitions database for mergers and acquisitions announced 
during 1979-2007.  Regressions are estimated using Logit, where the dependent variable equals 1 if the 
merger is completed, and 0 if it is not completed.  The model includes calendar-year dummies.  Statistical 
significance is computed using heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors that are 
clustered at the investment bank level.  ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively.  Coefficient estimates are reported with z-statistics in parentheses.     
 
        
Dependent variable Pr (Merger Completion) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Completion ratio, 1-year 1.726***   
 (4.03)   
Completion ratio, 2-year  1.643***  
  (4.34)  
Completion ratio, 3-year   1.304*** 
   (3.24) 
Prior acquisition returns, 1-year 0.001   
 (0.00)   
Prior acquisition returns, 2-year  0.193  
  (0.34)  
Prior acquisition returns. 3-year   -0.233 
   (0.38) 
Advisor's market share 0.367 0.155 0.071 
 (0.41) (0.18) (0.08) 
Prior experience as advisor 0.018 -0.004 -0.013 
 (0.14) (0.03) (0.11) 
Advisor is prior underwriter 0.092 0.036 0.030 
 (0.76) (0.30) (0.25) 
Log(number of transactions as acquirer) -0.072*** -0.072*** -0.068*** 
 (3.28) (3.40) (3.27) 
Number of bidders -0.971*** -0.987*** -0.993*** 
 (10.55) (10.84) (11.26) 
Paid by cash 0.249** 0.235** 0.213** 
 (2.32) (2.28) (2.12) 
Firms in similar industries 0.151 0.217** 0.222** 
 (1.63) (2.43) (2.54) 
Log(number of target industries) -0.510*** -0.484*** -0.461*** 
 (7.41) (7.29) (7.04) 
Hostile takeover -2.329*** -2.411*** -2.423*** 
 (14.77) (16.16) (16.60) 
Log(merger value/acquirer size) -0.259*** -0.252*** -0.243*** 
 (7.52) (7.42) (7.17) 
Constant 2.093*** 2.207*** 2.503*** 
  (4.94) (5.84) (6.27) 
Observations 6,424 7,003 7,213 
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Table 3 
Determinants of acquirer CAR 
 
This table reports the determinants of acquirer cumulative abnormal returns around the time of a merger 
announcement.  Data are obtained from the SDC Mergers and Acquisitions database for mergers and 
acquisitions announced during 1979-2007.  The dependent variable is acquirer CAR in the 3 days (-1; +1) 
surrounding the merger announcement.  The model includes calendar-year dummies.  The regressions are 
estimated using ordinary least squares.  Statistical significance is computed using heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation robust standard errors that are clustered at the investment bank level.  ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  Coefficient estimates are reported with t-
statistics in parentheses.   
       
Dependent Variable Acquirer Announcement Returns 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Completion ratio, 1-year 0.053   
 (1.45)   
Completion ratio, 2-year  -0.024  
  (0.73)  
Completion ratio, 3-year   -0.044 
   (1.27) 
Prior acquisition returns, 1-year 0.124**   
 (2.28)   
Prior acquisition returns, 2-year  0.077  
  (1.32)  
Prior acquisition returns. 3-year   0.101 
   (1.53) 
Advisor's market share -0.012 -0.034 -0.059 
 (0.21) (0.62) (1.07) 
Prior experience as advisor -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.75) (0.78) (0.84) 
Advisor is prior underwriter 0.003 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.45) (0.07) (0.09) 
Log(number of transactions as acquirer) -0.006* -0.006* -0.005* 
 (1.77) (1.92) (1.80) 
Number of bidders -0.010 -0.011* -0.011* 
 (1.51) (1.70) (1.73) 
Paid by cash 0.014** 0.013** 0.012** 
 (2.01) (2.07) (2.00) 
Firms in similar industries -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.03) 
Log(number of target industries) -0.011* -0.010* -0.010* 
 (1.79) (1.73) (1.77) 
Hostile takeover 0.007 0.000 0.000 
 (0.59) (0.01) (0.02) 
Log(merger value/acquirer size) 0.004 0.004* 0.003 
 (1.57) (1.72) (1.59) 
Constant  (-0.01) (0.06) 0.077** 
  (0.16) (1.63) (2.02) 
Observations 1,815 1,986 2,038 
R-squared 2.38% 1.80% 1.78% 
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Table 4 
Summary statistics of advisor CAR for firms with strong and weak corporate governance 
 
This table reports the average announcement period CAR for acquirers, split by the 2-year completion ratio 
of the acquirer’s advisor.  Merger data are obtained from the SDC Mergers and Acquisitions database.  
Governance data are obtained from the IRRC Institute.  Mergers with advisors above (below) the median 
completion ratio are assigned to the high (low) sub-samples, shown in columns 1 and 3 (2 and 4).  Panel A 
reports CAR for firms with weak corporate governance: G-index values in the top tercile and managerial 
ownership in the bottom tercile.  Panel B reports CAR for firms with strong corporate governance: G-index 
values in the bottom tercile and managerial ownership in the top tercile.  Bold typeface indicates that 
statistic is different from zero at the 0.10 level.  P-values of the t-test for the difference between the means 
and medians are reported. 
 
            
Percentage of completed deals, 2-year High  Low  Difference 
          P-value 
 G-index high 
5-days acquirer returns around acquisition announcement      
Mean -2.84%  -0.43%  0.05 
Median -2.08%  -0.70%  0.26 
      
 G-index low 
5-days acquirer returns around acquisition announcement      
Mean 2.29%  -1.86%  0.02 
Median 0.84%  -1.98%  0.12 
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Table 5 
Determinants of advisor CAR for firms with strong and weak corporate governance 
 
This table reports the determinants of 3-day (-1; +1) acquirer cumulative abnormal returns around the 
merger announcement date for firms with strong and weak corporate governance.  Merger data are obtained 
from the SDC Mergers and Acquisitions database.  Governance data are obtained from the IRRC Institute.  
The dependent variable is acquirer CAR in the 3 days (-1; +1) surrounding the merger announcement.  The 
regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares.  Statistical significance is computed using 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors that are clustered at the investment bank level.  
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  Coefficient estimates are 
reported with t-statistics in parentheses.  P-values of the t-test for the difference between the coefficients 
are reported.   
 
             
Dependent Variable: Acquirer Returns    
     
G-index High Low P-value High Low P-value 
  (1) (2) Diff (3) (4) Diff 
Completion ratio, 2-year -0.084 0.376*** 0.004    
 (1.02) (2.80)     
Completion ratio, 3-year    -0.215* 0.309** 0.005 
    (1.98) (2.08)  
Prior acquisition returns, 2-year 0.015 -0.057     
 (0.11) (0.62)     
Prior acquisition returns, 3-year    0.103 -0.356**  
    (0.83) (1.99)  
Advisor's market share 0.184 0.275  0.129 0.262  
 (1.22) (1.31)  (0.85) (1.15)  
Prior experience as advisor -0.014 0.034*  -0.012 0.037*  
 (0.71) (1.72)  (0.62) (1.90)  
Advisor is prior underwriter -0.006 0.013  -0.005 0.009  
 (0.31) (0.66)  (0.28) (0.50)  
Log(number of transactions as acquirer) 0.005 -0.016**  0.002 -0.017**  
 (0.87) (2.38)  (0.45) (2.47)  
Number of bidders 0.029 -0.006  0.028 -0.007  
 (1.08) (0.36)  (1.00) (0.42)  
Paid by cash 0.032** 0.059***  0.033* 0.054***  
 (2.01) (2.91)  (1.94) (2.73)  
Firms in similar industries 0.009 -0.005  0.011 -0.007  
 (0.61) (0.21)  (0.75) (0.30)  
Log(number of target industries) 0.008 0.002  0.011 0.003  
 (0.63) (0.12)  (0.82) (0.16)  
Hostile takeover 0.110** -0.070*  0.108** -0.069*  
 (2.40) (1.88)  (2.21) (1.93)  
Log(merger value/acquirer size) -0.011*** 0.002  -0.011*** 0.004  
 (2.78) (0.38)  (2.75) (0.67)  
Constant -0.034 -0.331**  0.056 -0.265*  
  (0.42) (2.60)   (0.58) (1.91)   
Observations 158 157  161 159  
R-squared 17.29% 14.82%   17.42% 14.30%   
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Table 6 
Placebo tests of the determinants of advisor CAR for firms with strong and weak corporate governance 
 
This table reports the determinants of 3-day (-1; +1) acquirer cumulative abnormal returns around the 
merger announcement date for firms with strong and weak corporate governance.  Merger data are obtained 
from the SDC Mergers and Acquisitions database.  Governance data are obtained from the IRRC Institute.  
The dependent variable is acquirer CAR in the 3 days (-1; +1) surrounding the merger announcement.  The 
regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares.  Statistical significance is computed using 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors that are clustered at the investment bank level.  
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  Coefficient estimates are 
reported with t-statistics in parentheses.  P-values of the t-test for the difference between the coefficients 
are reported.   
 
             
Dependent Variable: 
Acquirer Returns    
 OLS: Acquirer Return   OLS: Acquirer Return 
G-index Low Low P-value Low Low P-value 
Advisor Actual Placebo   Actual Placebo   
  (1) (2) Difference (3) (4) Diff 
Completion ratio, 2-year 0.376*** -0.085 0.011    
 (2.80) (0.69)     
Completion ratio, 3-year    0.309** -0.100 0.025 
        (2.08) (0.96)   
Observations 157 158  159 165  
R-squared 14.82% 12.69%   14.30% 12.38%   
       
             
Dependent Variable: 
Acquirer Returns    
 OLS: Acquirer Return   OLS: Acquirer Return 
G-index High High P-value High High P-value 
Advisor Actual Placebo   Actual Placebo   
  (1) (2) Difference (3) (4) Diff 
Completion ratio, 2-year -0.084 -0.123 0.747    
 (1.02) (1.25)     
Completion ratio, 3-year    -0.215* -0.046 0.128 
        (1.98) (1.21)   
Observations 158 150  161 158  
R-squared 17.29% 21.38%   17.42% 19.39%   
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Table 7 
 
Global IPO Activity 
 
This table presents global IPOs purchased by affiliated and unaffiliated mutual funds.  Affiliated mutual funds are 
affiliated with the IPO's lead underwriter. Initial return is the percentage difference between the IPO offering price 
and the first-day closing price. Data are obtained from the SDC New Issues database for IPOs, and mutual fund 
holdings data are taken from the FactSet LionShares database.  The sample period is 1999-2009. 
                
 Number of IPOs purchased by Initial Return Proceeds ($ million) 
 
Affiliated 
Mutual 
Funds 
Unaffiliated 
Mutual 
Funds 
Total 
Affiliated 
Mutual 
Funds 
Unaffiliated 
Mutual 
Funds 
Affiliated 
Mutual 
Funds 
Unaffiliated 
Mutual Funds 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Australia 7 129 136 12.0% 35.1% 283.7 71.0 
Hong Kong 26 100 126 7.9% 20.4% 487.4 107.7 
India 17 41 58 40.5% 54.4% 456.2 82.2 
Japan 79 289 368 42.0% 59.3% 239.5 32.8 
Singapore 10 49 59 5.6% 27.6% 322.8 59.2 
  Asia-Pacific 
Total 
139 608 747 31.3% 44.9%** 320.6*** 58.7 
        
Austria 9 13 22 1.6% 6.5% 437.2 218.6 
Belgium 15 6 21 1.7% 11.4% 344.5 151.2 
Denmark 2 10 12 4.0% 4.9% 69.6 68.1 
Finland 5 5 10 9.9% -4.4% 274.0 58.0 
France 40 119 159 8.1% 10.6% 777.2 43.9 
Germany 79 153 232 11.9% 13.6% 363.6 66.3 
Greece 7 21 28 -5.4% 23.7% 154.4 115.3 
Ireland 1 5 6 5.4% 11.2% 1,719.1 78.9 
Italy 5 51 56 1.1% 13.1% 214.5 424.6 
Netherlands 17 17 34 17.5% 24.6% 428.7 165.7 
Norway 7 27 34 20.7% 36.8% 553.4 120.0 
Poland 3 20 23 8.0% 32.6% 224.4 38.4 
Spain 16 14 30 4.6% 0.7% 1,185.1 250.4 
Sweden 10 13 23 7.4% 16.0% 947.5 162.9 
Switzerland 13 11 24 14.9% 42.0% 470.0 76.9 
United Kingdom 28 126 154 12.5% 22.4% 772.6 98.2 
  Europe Total 257 611 868 9.7% 16.9%*** 553.7*** 114.9 
        
South Africa 2 10 12 -0.3% 18.5% 332.6 94.1 
  Africa Total 2 10 12 -0.3% 18.5% 332.6 94.1 
        
Canada 26 69 95 17.9% 20.9% 194.2 63.9 
  Americas  
  (excl. U.S.) Total 
26 69 95 17.9% 20.9% 194.2** 63.9 
        
United States 279 635 914 46.1%*** 30.0% 407.1*** 110.1 
        
Grand Total 703 1,933 2,636 28.5% 30.1% 437.0*** 93.8 
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Table 8 
IPO Initial Returns, Fund-Underwriter Affiliation, and Investor Protection 
 
This table reports IPO initial returns based on (i) affiliations between the offering's underwriter and the 
mutual funds that were allocated the offering, and (ii) country-level measures of investor protection.  
Affiliated mutual funds are funds that are affiliated with the IPO's lead underwriter. Initial return is the 
percentage difference between the IPO offering price and the first-day closing price.  Investor protection 
variables are the anti-self dealing index (DLLS 2008), the disclosure requirements index (LLS 2006), 
prospectus liability index (LLS 2006), and judicial quality index (Khorana, Servaes, and Tufano 2005).  
Data are obtained from the SDC New Issues database for IPOs, and mutual fund holdings data are taken 
from the FactSet LionShares database.  The sample period is 1999-2009. 
                      
     Number of IPOs  Initial Return: Mean 
Investor 
Protection 
    Affiliated Unaffiliated  Affiliated Unaffiliated P-value 
Variable  Value  (1) (2)  (3) (4) (3)-(4) 
           
Anti-self dealing 
index 
 (a) 
Above 
median 
 218 839  24.1% 38.0% 0.003 
  (b) 
Below 
median 
 206 459  10.0% 16.0% 0.064 
     P-value (a)-(b):  0.001 0.002  
           
Disclosure 
requirements 
 (c) 
Above 
median 
 238 952  23.2% 35.3% 0.004 
index  (d) 
Below 
median 
 186 346  9.6% 16.1% 0.075 
     P-value (c)-(d):  0.001 0.003  
           
Prospectus 
liability index 
 (e) 
Above 
median 
 236 869  22.3% 35.4% 0.001 
  (f) 
Below 
median 
 188 429  8.3% 14.2% 0.039 
     P-value (e)-(f):  0.001 0.001  
           
Judicial system 
quality 
 (g) 
Above 
median 
 193 609  23.1% 39.7% 0.001 
  (h) 
Below 
median 
 231 689  10.3% 18.3% 0.005 
     P-value (g)-(h):  0.001 0.001  
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Table 9 
Determinants of IPO Initial Return 
 
This table reports the determinants of IPO initial return, defined as the percentage difference between the 
IPO offering price and the first-day closing price.  Affiliate purchases is an indicator that takes a value of 
one if the IPO is allocated to a mutual fund affiliated with the offering's lead underwriter.  Investor 
protection variables are the anti-self dealing index (DLLS 2008), the disclosure requirements index (LLS 
2006), and prospectus liability index (LLS 2006).  Price adjustment is the precentage adjustment from the 
midpoint of the initial filing price and the final offering price.  Underwriter reputation is the lead 
underwriter's market share in the year of the offering.  Ln(Assets) is the natural log of the IPO firm's assets 
following the offering.  Technology IPO is an indicator variable that takes a value for one if the IPO firm 
operates in a high-technology industry.  Unaffiliated ownership is the percentage of the offering purchased 
by mutual funds not affiliated with the lead underwriter.  Stock market development is the ratio of a 
country's stock market capitalization to GDP.  The model includes calendar-year dummies.  Regressions are 
estimated using ordinary least squares.  Statistical significance is computed using heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation robust standard errors that are clustered at the investment bank level.  ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  Coefficient estimates are reported with t-statistics 
in parentheses.  Data are obtained from the SDC New Issues database for IPOs, and mutual fund holdings 
data are taken from the FactSet LionShares database.  The sample period is 1999-2009.   
                
  Investor Protection Variable 
  Anti-Self Dealing 
Disclosure 
Requirements 
Prospectus Liability 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Affiliate purchases -0.050** -0.029 -0.060** -0.029 -0.095*** -0.046** -0.095*** 
 (2.29) (1.31) (2.10) -1.33 (3.31) (2.12) (3.43) 
Investor protection  0.418*** 0.388*** 0.369*** 0.056** 0.051*** 0.019 
  (6.95) (6.06) (7.15) (2.07) (2.64) (0.82) 
(Affiliate purchases) ×   0.063*  0.103***  0.108*** 
(Investor protection)   (1.74)  (2.62)  (2.70) 
        
Price adjustment 1.699*** 1.682*** 1.675*** 1.688*** 1.679*** 1.701*** 1.681*** 
 (17.93) (17.96) (17.95) (18.21) (17.87) (18.02) (17.67) 
Underwriter reputation 3.522*** 3.348*** 3.226*** 2.968*** 3.171*** 3.301*** 3.212*** 
 (5.65) (5.46) (5.23) (4.83) (5.14) (5.23) (5.11) 
Ln(Assets) -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.007 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.57) (0.27) (0.31) (1.41) (0.89) (0.83) (0.66) 
Technology IPO 0.115*** 0.115*** 0.113*** 0.100*** 0.110*** 0.111*** 0.111*** 
 (4.88) (4.92) (4.83) (4.31) (4.67) (4.69) (4.71) 
Unaffiliated ownership -0.032*** -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.033*** -0.034*** -0.033*** -0.033*** 
 (6.95) (7.76) (7.77) (7.20) (7.36) (7.18) (7.09) 
Stock market development 0.030** -0.052*** -0.052*** -0.020 0.004 0.027* 0.026* 
  (2.08) (2.74) (2.74) (1.24) (0.24) (1.95) (1.86) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,636 2,636 2,636 2,613 2,613 2,613 2,613 
Adjusted R-squared 22.42% 23.59% 23.63% 23.76% 22.90% 22.54% 22.70% 
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Table 10 
Determinants of IPO Allocations to Affiliates 
 
This table reports the determinants of IPO allocations to mutual funds affiliated with the offering’s 
lead underwriter.  The dependent variable is an indicator that takes a value of one if the IPO is 
allocated to a mutual fund affiliated with the offering's lead underwriter.  Cold IPO is an indicator that 
takes a value of one if an IPO has a negative initial return.  Investor protection variables are the 
common law dummy (LLSV 1998), anti-self dealing index (DLLS 2008), the disclosure requirements 
index (LLS 2006), prospectus liability index (LLS 2006), and judicial quality index (Khorana, 
Servaes, and Tufano 2005).  Price adjustment is the precentage adjustment from the midpoint of the 
initial filing price and the final offering price.  Underwriter reputation is the lead underwriter's market 
share in the year of the offering.  Ln(Assets) is the natural log of the IPO firm's assets following the 
offering.  Technology IPO is an indicator variable that takes a value for one if the IPO firm operates 
in a high-technology industry.  Unaffiliated ownership is the percentage of the offering purchased by 
mutual funds not affiliated with the lead underwriter.  Stock market development is the ratio of a 
country's stock market capitalization to GDP.  The model includes calendar-year dummies.  
Regressions are estimated using logit.  Statistical significance is computed using heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation robust standard errors that are clustered at the investment bank level.  ***, **, 
and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  Coefficient estimates are 
reported with z-statistics in parentheses.  Data are obtained from the SDC New Issues database for 
IPOs, and mutual fund holdings data are taken from the FactSet LionShares database.  The sample 
period is 1999-2009.   
              
   
 Anti-Self Dealing 
Disclosure 
Requirements 
Prospectus Liability 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Cold IPO  0.314  0.894*  0.170 
  (0.83)  (1.80)  (1.06) 
Investor protection -2.917*** -2.808*** -1.953*** -1.727*** -0.346*** -0.229* 
 (8.35) (7.73) (6.64) (5.42) (3.25) (1.94) 
(Cold IPO) × (Investor 
protection) 
 -0.638  -1.189**  -0.590** 
  (1.04)  (1.99)  (2.25) 
Price adjustment 1.957*** 1.939*** 2.122*** 2.045*** 2.013*** 1.912*** 
 (4.56) (4.52) (4.72) (4.57) (4.65) (4.41) 
Underwriter reputation 14.394*** 14.392*** 16.851*** 16.739*** 15.804*** 15.564*** 
 (5.89) (5.90) (6.75) (6.72) (6.41) (6.27) 
Ln(Assets) 0.285*** 0.284*** 0.308*** 0.306*** 0.291*** 0.289*** 
 (9.96) (9.93) (10.63) (10.54) (10.23) (10.16) 
Technology IPO 0.489*** 0.488*** 0.560*** 0.556*** 0.551*** 0.539*** 
 (4.31) (4.30) (4.88) (4.83) (4.82) (4.69) 
Unaffiliated ownership 0.209*** 0.209*** 0.176*** 0.177*** 0.182*** 0.181*** 
 (7.08) (7.09) (6.88) (6.89) (7.40) (7.40) 
Stock market development 0.092 0.104 -0.204** -0.199** -0.481*** -0.488*** 
 (0.89) (1.00) (2.24) (2.19) (5.43) (5.48) 
Constant -4.040*** -4.116*** -3.498*** -3.678*** -4.590*** -4.609*** 
  (10.83) (10.80) (9.67) (9.72) (14.22) (14.28) 
Observations 2,636 2,636 2,613 2,613 2,613 2,613 
Pseudo R-squared 17.33% 17.37% 16.59% 16.73% 15.36% 15.53% 
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Table 11 
Determinants of IPO Pre-Offer Price Adjustments 
 
This table reports the determinants of IPO pre-offer price adjustments, defined as the precentage 
adjustment from the midpoint of the initial filing price and the final offering price.  Affiliate purchases is 
an indicator that takes a value of one if the IPO is allocated to a mutual fund affiliated with the offering's 
lead underwriter.  Investor protection variables are the anti-self dealing index (DLLS 2008), the disclosure 
requirements index (LLS 2006), prospectus liability index (LLS 2006), and judicial quality index 
(Khorana, Servaes, and Tufano 2005).  Ln(Assets) is the natural log of the IPO firm's assets following the 
offering.  Technology IPO is an indicator variable that takes a value for one if the IPO firm operates in a 
high-technology industry.  Unaffiliated ownership is the percentage of the offering purchased by mutual 
funds not affiliated with the lead underwriter.  Stock market development is the ratio of a country's stock 
market capitalization to GDP.  The model includes calendar-year dummies.  Regressions are estimated 
using ordinary least squares.  Statistical significance is computed using heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation robust standard errors that are clustered at the investment bank level.  ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  Coefficient estimates are reported with 
t-statistics in parentheses.  Data are obtained from the SDC New Issues database for IPOs, and mutual 
fund holdings data are taken from the FactSet LionShares database.  The sample period is 1999-2009.   
                      
       Investor Protection Variable 
    
Anti-Self 
Dealing  
 
Disclosure 
Requirements 
 
Prospectus 
Liability 
 
Judicial System 
Quality 
   (1)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Affiliate purchases  0.025***  0.014**  0.009  0.010*  0.005 
  (4.450)  (2.484)  (1.569)  (1.863)  (0.677) 
Investor protection    0.013  0.000  -0.004  -0.002*** 
    (1.174)  (0.010)  (0.448)  (3.362) 
(Affiliate Purchases) × 
(Investor protection) 
   0.024**  0.033***  0.035***  0.031*** 
    (2.500)  (3.317)  (3.381)  (3.582) 
Underwriter reputation  0.572***  0.513***  0.509***  0.508***  0.561*** 
  (3.952)  (3.523)  (3.475)  (3.426)  (3.887) 
Ln(Assets)  -0.002**  -0.002**  -0.002**  -0.002**  -0.002** 
  (2.183)  (2.160)  (2.142)  (2.027)  (2.094) 
Technology IPO  0.018***  0.018***  0.018***  0.018***  0.019*** 
  (3.180)  (3.050)  (3.155)  (3.155)  (3.330) 
Unaffiliated ownership  -0.003***  -0.003***  -0.003***  -0.003***  -0.003*** 
  (4.077)  (4.281)  (4.346)  (4.311)  (4.140) 
Stock market development  0.016***  0.011***  0.014***  0.016***  0.017*** 
  (5.956)   (3.807)   (4.834)   (6.088)   (6.432) 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  2,636  2,636  2,613  2,613  2,613 
Adjusted R-squared   9.29%   9.55%   9.82%   9.84%   9.77% 
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Table 12 
Long-Run Performance of Affiliated and Unaffiliated IPOs 
 
This table reports IPO long-run returns based on affiliations between the offering's underwriter 
and the mutual funds that were allocated the offering.  Affiliated mutual funds are funds that 
are affiliated with the IPO's lead underwriter. 3-year holding period return is the percentage 
difference between the IPO offering price and the closing price three years after the offering.  
Benchmarks are the CRSP value-weighted index, and the return on the offering’s Fama French 
size decile portfolio.  Data are obtained from the SDC New Issues database for IPOs, and 
mutual fund holdings data are taken from the FactSet LionShares database.  The sample period 
is 1999-2009. 
              
  Initial Return   
  Affiliated  Unaffiliated  P-value 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (1)-(2) 
       
3-year holding period return, unadjusted  -10.0%  -3.5%  0.128 
       
3-year return minus CRSP value-weighted 
index 
 -3.6%  -1.8%  0.617 
       
3-year return minus size decile return  -10.9%  -9.4%  0.455 
       
Number of Observations  582  1,503   
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